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synopsis 
 
The aim of this paper is to give a long term sustainability perspective on 
instrumentation  in environmental policy, within a broad, also strategic, 
evaluative framework. 
 
To arrive at integrated insight, the basic function of policy instruments is 
discussed: why do you need them at all and how would they look like? It comes 
out that it is not at all clear how policy instruments can be classified and 
described. Nor is it clear how a consistent evaluation of policy instruments can 
be set up. Still,  as some ordering is necessary for instrument development and 
instrument choice, an analytic framework is developed. 
 
One basic problem in discussions on policy instruments is that both their 
functioning and their effects are context dependent. This implies that in 
decisions on policy instrumentation, binding society for a long time, also long 
term changes in context are to be taken into account, in terms of structural, 
cultural and economic developments in society. Some main lines of 
development are discussed, with implications for instrument choice. 
 
Within these mouldable boundaries, some practical guidelines are given for 
policy development at a case level.  
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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN A NEW ERA 
Aim 
This paper indicates the ways in which societies can use instruments for reaching 
environmental policy goals. There are four main aims in studying this chapter: 
- to grasp the essential role of policy instruments in environmental policy 
- to understand the general  working mechanism of the main groups of instruments, and the 
strengths and weaknesses of  specific instrument configurations 
- to understand the dynamics of policy instrumentation in a dynamic context 
- develop a view on policy instrumentation as  required for  long term sustainable 
development of society.  
Survey  
When analysing policy instruments, the question arises as to what exactly they are. Answering 
this question first leads us to a number of preliminary themes. For instance, why do we need 
instruments for environmental policy if integrated policies, without specific instruments, can 
cover all problems? Focussing on the causal chains involved leads to a series of other 
questions. For instance, how should one define instruments, eg, in terms of implementation 
mechanisms, sanction mechanisms, or working mechanisms? If one places instruments in 
their administrative setting, with the emphasis on horizontal governance, there again is the 
question: why do we need them?  The answers given are: for simplification of policy, and for 
building into the fabric of society the safeguards for long term sustainability.  
 
After taking these hurdles, the analysis builds up around the theme: what is the nature of 
environmental problems, and what are the general mechanisms for their occurrence? Concepts 
like ‘external effects’, ‘collective goods’ and ‘free rider problems’ are surveyed, as it is in this 
particular context that instruments should bring solutions. A final introductory theme is the 
evaluation of alternative instruments for environmental policy. A distinction is made here 
between first order criteria like effectiveness and costs; second order criteria covering aspects 
not easily modelled, like requirements on administrative capacity and effects on technology 
development; and strategic third order criteria. As instrument choices may bind society for 
decades, long-term strategic aspects, such as their fitting into overall regulatory 
developments, are a prime element in their evaluation. 
 
Next, a survey follows of the main dimensions instruments can be specified in. Not only the 
traditional regulator-regulatee relations are covered but also instruments structuring the 
relations between different governmental organisations, and instruments structuring relations 
between private actors, both individuals and organisations.  
 
In the last section, some major societal developments are surveyed, with a view on the 
implications for the functioning of different environmental policy instruments. The 
consequences of globalisation processes are indicated and some major strategic choices on 
overall policy instrumentation are worked out.  
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1 POLICY INSTRUMENTS: 
WHAT ARE THEY AND WHAT ARE THEY GOOD FOR? 
1.1 Policy instruments: what are they? 
There are many instruments that possibly are relevant for environmental policy, like tools for 
analysis, checklists, and plans. More generally, instruments for environmental policy can be 
seen as the means for executing this policy. Here, a more restrictive definition is used: 
Instruments for environmental policy are structured activities aimed at 
changing other activities in society towards environmental goals. 
 
Of course, not all policy instruments are for environmental policy. Other instruments for 
public policy, like in energy and transport policy, may include environmental policy goals, as 
an extra on top of the prime non-environmental goal. This is the usual case now in most 
integrated policies. The borderline, therefore, is not strict. However, this is not a real problem, 
as policy instruments for non-environmental goals may be analysed in a similar way.  
Not all policies are structured. Setting up the high-speed railway line to diminish air traffic 
between Paris and Lyon indeed reduced air traffic at first, and reduced its growth afterwards. 
Green politicians may exhort people in public speeches to leave their car at home for at least 
one day a week, with some success. Such incidental activities towards policy goals, however, 
are not seen as instruments. If, on the other hand, high-speed railroads are built consistently 
on trajectories with rising air traffic, one may see the provision of infrastructure as an option-
creating type of policy instrument. If a politician’s speeches are part of a series set up for 
public education, they too may be seen as part of a communicative instrument. The borderline 
is not strict, which, again, is not a problem.  
 
As a last borderline in the definition, it may not be clear what exactly the environmental 
policy goals of some instruments are, and if these goals really are environmental ones. 
Raising prices for dumping waste in landfill sites may have non-environmental aims; e.g., to 
increase the availability of landfill sites or to give an incentive for increased use of under-
utilised incineration plants. Or it may, supposedly, be a means for reducing primary materials 
production, reducing resource depletion and the environmental effects related to materials 
processing. What exactly constitutes the ‘real’ prime motive is often difficult to establish, but 
also not very relevant. Such borderline instruments still may be analysed as instruments for 
environmental policy, with environmental effectiveness as one aspect in their assessment. The 
actual environmental effectiveness of instruments in most cases is not a distinguishing 
criterion. In certain circumstances, subsidies on environmental improvements may work out 
negatively, by delaying structural change which otherwise would have taken place. These 
then are environmental policy instruments not adequate for that situation, but they still are 
environmental policy instruments.  
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1.2 Why have policy instruments? 
Why bother about environmental policy instruments when actual policies based on integrated 
assessments can integrate environmental and other consequences in day-today actions? The 
main reason is that the complexity of all empirical relations, and the complexity of assessment 
are so large, and the information requirements so vast, that this option is not really available. 
Instruments work by simplifying reality. They can be studied and assessed at a general level, 
with conditions on their sensible application stated. The complexity of policy making is thus 
reduced. On the receiving side, in society, most policies have their effects not in terms of 
directly correcting current activities but, to a large part, by guiding the planning of and 
decision making on future activities. Having instruments of which the nature is known from 
literature and past experience will make policies more predictive and adaptation to policies 
easier. These adaptive mechanisms in society, if structured in stable patterns, can be seen as 
part of policy instrumentation as such. 
1.3 A framework for analysing policy instruments 
Different policy instruments may be characterised in a common framework, with an empirical 
part, how they work, and an evaluative part, with criteria on how good and adequate they may 
be. The evaluative part will be worked out in a later section. The framework for the empirical 
part of the analysis has four main units: regulators, regulatees, society, and environment. 
These four units, for one country or region, are mirrored in the same entities abroad, see 
Figure 1.  The framework defines the basic structure for modelling the functioning of 
environmental policy instruments. In a most basic mechanical model, there is a single causal 
chain from regulator’s actions to environmental effects. This limited framework already opens 
up a world in which a rich variety of instruments and a high complexity of mechanisms can be 
distinguished. That means that even in its simplest form, effects of regulations depend on the 
specific circumstances given in society. 
 
The starting point in the model is some public regulation, a collective one, like setting an 
emission standard in the metals plating industry, or a private one, like setting an 
environmental performance goal for a firm. As a first step in the causal chain, there is the 
technical adjustment enforced on regulatees as the subjects of instrument application (1). A 
second step of causal chains is centred around economic mechanisms, usually, and related to 
the costs induced on regulatees (2). The degree to which such secondary effects are taken into 
account may vary. Effects on markets and on other technologies will usually be part of the 
analysis, and will depend on the specific circumstances in these markets. Stricter emission 
standards in a small open economy with a few large internationally operating firms may lead 
to emission reduction by shifting production to locations abroad, without necessarily changing 
technologies. Conversely, in a large country with many small firms producing for the national 
market, technology adjustments will be more pronounced, with only limited changes in the 
volumes produced.  For given national technical effects and volume changes, the net resulting 
environmental interventions can be derived and linked to effects on the national environment 
(3) and on the environment abroad (4). As most markets are international now, national 
policies will induce economic changes abroad (5), also with certain environmental effects. 
Finally, policies in one country may directly influence policies abroad (6). Dutch excises on 
petrol, e.g., are limited by the German excises on petrol, as a too large differential will lead to 
the closing of gasoline stations in the border regions. Californian regulations on ‘emission 
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free cars’ have set in motion regulatory activities and technology development in Japan and 
Europe, and at a global scale.  
 
The model with one-way causalities does, however, not correspond to full reality, where 
feedback mechanisms, always dynamic, abound. If regulatory capacity is limited, as in some 
way it always is, using regulatory power for solving one problem precludes its application for 
solving others. Using one type of instrument for one problem, like covenants on achieving 
best available practice for energy saving in industry, will make the later introduction of 
emissions taxes on CO2 and NOx rather unacceptable for industry. Negotiations on a covenant 
depend on what industry sees as an alternative to the covenant: maybe emissions taxes or 
maybe avoiding costly actions. Hence, such negotiations necessarily take place “in the 
shadow of the law”", as phrased by Galanter (1981) and Scharpf (1991). Indirect effects in 
society, through induced economic and environmental developments, result through complex 
feedback mechanisms. A most common mechanism is that regulations induce costs and hence 
lead to market changes and technology adaptations. For instance, costly measures to reduce 
emissions in the metals plating industry have induced a shift to high quality coatings, with 
other types of emissions resulting. On the other hand, by inducing changes in an industry, cost 
saving innovations that are available already may then be introduced in a faster and broader 
way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ultimate feedback, of course, is through environmental quality. The poor air quality in 
Mexico City raises costs of production, lowers legitimacy of government, and makes it 
difficult for firms to attract managers and specialists from abroad. Visible actions, in terms of 
standards and regulations, are most apt to remedy these negative effects in the short term, by 
assuring that ‘something is done’. Less visible actions like changes in liability rules and 
1 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Table 1 Regulation: a simple 
model without feedback loops 
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market structure might, however, be more effective in the end. Hence, a feedback loop may 
influence instrument choice.  
Feedback mechanisms by nature are dynamic. Having set up a policy for some environmental 
problem in a certain way, e.g. by issuing emission rights, makes it very difficult socially and 
even juridically to change over to policy instruments more in line with the polluter-pays-
principle, where emitters have to pay for their infringement on the right of others not to be 
polluted.  
 
Why is the question of how instruments work so important for the characterisation of 
instruments? The answer is that instruments are not independently given; their definition and 
description, and the analysis of their functioning are closely related. Most instrument 
definitions focus on only one element in their functioning. The covenant, e.g., focuses on the 
procedure in the policy formation process; technical prescriptions focus on technologies as 
applied in industry; tradable emission permits focus on equalisation of marginal emission 
reduction costs between firms, industries, or countries; liability rules focus on specific 
enforcement procedures and actual compensation. Neither of these descriptions takes into 
account all steps in the framework, let alone the feedback loops as will usually exist.  
Limited description may easily lead to simple assumptions on the other steps in the causal 
chains required for environmental effectiveness. For instance, many believe that emission 
permits may not be ideal in terms of costs, but that at least they are a sure means in reaching 
specified results. In most countries, however, this belief is not well founded (Bonus et al., 
1998; Vogel, 1986; Hawkins, 1984; and Bardach & Kagan, 1982). Rules are often on paper 
only and not necessarily linked to actual practice. Environmental standards and regulations in 
the former Soviet Union belonged to the most stringent in the world while environmental 
quality was worse than in most other countries. This means that by defining or at least 
viewing their functioning in the broader framework, the myopia of partial views can be 
avoided. Thus, the context of their functioning becomes more important.  
1.4 Policy instruments in context 
Most people would agree that policy instruments are to be placed in the broader framework of 
their functioning. However, this could lead to counterintuitive results. Filling in this 
framework may show that what is named the same instrument, actually is something different 
in different contexts. Implementation of one and the same instrument may also be very 
different, depending on prevailing circumstances. In litigious societies with limited general 
legitimacy, legislation may be implemented effectively only with years of delay, while in 
highly integrated less formalistic countries, legislation and implementation may be nearly 
synchronous (see Vogel, 1986). Similarly, with regulatees, technology-binding legislation 
may lead to adversary reactions, or it may lead to internalisation of the rules enacted.  
 
The broader effects of policy instruments in society heavily depend on already established 
institutions. In several communist countries, emissions taxes have been enacted, but to no 
avail. (See Endres 1997 for the contextual requirements for market based instruments.) As 
volume increases in production were the prime aim for state-owned firms, with prices fixed 
and with the state bearing profits and losses, the emissions tax was just added on the balance 
sheet, with no behavioural consequences in the firm itself (see Cole and Clark, 1998). By 
contrast, similar taxes in capitalist countries with competitive markets may induce far-
reaching behavioural changes. For instance, Dutch waste water taxes enacted in the 1970s 
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were followed by overall decreases in effluent volume by a factor 20, mainly through process 
integrated technology changes (Bressers, 1988; Huppes & Kagan, 1991).   
 
In some Western countries, like England and the Netherlands, policy development and 
implementation were linked in a less recognisable way. There was a broadly accepted practice 
that firms would function without the obligatory permits (see Vogel, 1986). In such a ‘slightly 
illegal’ situation, regulators may actually have more influence on developments than when a 
seemingly strict permit is issued which tends to petrify the past. Tendencies towards a more 
formalised and litigious type of society, as in the US, have made this style of regulation more 
difficult. In the old situation, there was bargaining in the shadow of the (possibly 
unreasonable) law, with a permit as an eventual short-term fixation of a situation. In the new, 
more formalised situation, it is not so clear how administrators can have a flexible influence. 
The covenant has taken over the bargaining step, while the shadow has not been clearly 
defined. Thus, the precise definition of an instrument depends on a more precise look at its 
functioning. In the Dutch and English contexts, for example, permits actually were not the 
‘real’ instruments for environmental policy at all; they rather formed the background for 
negotiations, with mostly informal deals between regulators and regulatees achieving actual 
environmental improvements.  
 
The recognition of the contextual specificity of policy instruments seems to give a blow to the 
basic aim for distinguishing policy instruments: to simplify reality and make behaviour of all 
concerned more predictable. If instruments as officially used hide what actually is happening, 
they just increase complexity and may better be left out. In the administrative sciences and in 
sociology of law, the consequence of this type of analysis has indeed been that a prime view 
on instruments has been more or less abandoned. In horizontal government, as an ideal, all 
stakeholders participate, in principle at equal footing, with deals resulting as are most apt to 
the situation (see von Benda-Beckmann and Hoekema 1987).  Why, then, bother about 
instruments? The answer is not straightforward. Governments, with their own organisational, 
economic, and legal powers increasingly may use decentralised types of analytical tools to 
direct the outcomes of negotiating procedures in the right environmental direction. Such 
sensible developments should not be denied when discussing the role of instruments; they can 
instead be made part of the development of environmental policy instruments. Therefore, 
instruments can also cover situations where government may be invisible or even absent. 
 
Why, then, do we need environmental policy instruments at all? There are several reasons. 
First, a negative one. There are limits to horizontal government, on human resources and 
knowledge required for adequate negotiations. This limitation is there on the side of 
government but also with other stakeholders. Most firms hate continuous negotiation because 
it soaks away their management capacity and so endangers their current and future 
functioning. Sustainability requires the continuous adjustment of behaviour of all firms and all 
consumers, as now mainly guided by market considerations. Influencing this behaviour 
clearly is beyond the scope of the negotiating government. Hence, corrections on the 
outcomes of in-firm decision making, including technology development and product design, 
and of market processes can be the subject of negotiating governance only in special 
occasions, within the capacity limits of regulatory bodies.  
In addition, there is a more positively formulated reason for having environmental policy 
instruments. Institutional development in society somehow has to cope with sustainability in a 
structural way. Leaving a central value like sustainability to day-to-day negotiations would be 
unwise or even immoral. Somehow, quasi-automatic mechanisms, such as institutions, are to 
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be shaped to safeguard the sustainability of operational, tactical and strategic decisions. In 
these mechanisms, environmental policy instruments will play their indispensable part. 
In between, there are the negotiations on which instruments to apply and how to apply them. 
In this field, horizontal governance and instrument analysis overlap practically. The 
instruments, the more or less ready options for government action, constitute the ‘shadow of 
the law’ in which governments can safeguard the sustainability of the outcome of the 
negotiations in the networks involved.   
 
Still, there remains a domain where instruments at first sight may not seem to be relevant, as 
with some single big issues. For instance, should we just curb further growth of passenger air 
transport with its noise and emissions? One option here would be to limit the growth of 
airports, which would not require specific instruments for environmental policy, as long as 
airports are publicly owned. Another option, however, would be to use the price mechanism 
for environmental purposes. By taxing emissions of carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides and noise 
high enough, these emissions will be reduced, not only through technology adjustment but 
also through a reduction in the number of passengers transported. The growth of airports then 
would be reduced as a consequence of environmental measures, not as an indirect means for 
the environmental aims. Using instruments for environmental policy in this way may prove to 
be more useful than seemingly simple measures like preventing airports from growing. 
1.5 Environmental problems: causes and solutions 
In order to understand the working of instruments in solving environmental problems some 
insight in the causative mechanisms resulting in environmental problems is required. In 
virtually all causal models for societal actions, some rational actor models play a central role. 
It is within such rational actor models that many of the causes for environmental problems can 
be discerned.  
 
Common to all environmental problems is the causal mechanism that private advantages of 
some actions outweigh the negative effects for the persons (or organisations) deciding on that 
action, while at the same time this negative effect may be relevant to others. The negative 
effect then is external to these private considerations: it is an external effect. If the single 
owner of an island cuts down his forest for making his garden, he prefers the garden to the 
forest; there is no environmental problem involved yet. Only if others bother, about the 
disappearance of the forest or the consequences of its disappearance, there is an 
environmental problem. This is the collective good nature of environmental quality. It is a 
necessary mechanism for environmental problems to occur. In economic jargon, it is external 
effects of private actions that are detrimental to a collective good.  
A second (additional) mechanism in problem development is that the detrimental effects 
usually result from the actions of many. Though not strictly necessary in a logical sense, this 
is the typical situation for nearly all environmental problems. It is the tragedy of the 
commons. Single actions may hardly contribute to the problem but their multitude leads to 
overall undesirable effects, ultimately the breakdown of the ecological system. 
 
Together these two mechanisms have a power that is hard to break. If an individual producer 
or consumer corrects his behaviour, his action may have negative economic effects on 
himself, even if only in terms of the burden of bothering. At the same time, the positive 
effects on the environment might be negligible. In such cases, we end in the prisoners 
dilemma. Rational actors will only choose the behaviour with the preferred outcome if they 
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may expect most others to act in the same way. In the ‘wrong’ situation, actual behaviour by 
others proves that this expectation is not justified and rational actors will choose the sub-
optimal behaviour. If corrective action is taken by all but a few, the environmental problem is 
mainly solved, also for these few, while they do not bear their share in the costs. This is the 
free rider problem. If free riders are visible, social norms on collective action may easily 
erode and with it the collective environmental good. If the free rider is invisible, the flesh is 
weak. It then takes highly internalised values for most people to remain on the right track. 
 
Critique on this model has been that the rational actor model underlying it has a too simple 
view on real motives of real people. In reality, many actors indeed often behave altruistically, 
because they like doing so, and groups of actors often have an explicit or tacit mutual 
understanding on avoiding ‘bad’ behaviour (Sen, 1977). At least some people bother about 
separate collection of waste streams, even in instances where others cannot see what exactly 
they are doing. They have internalised environmental norms to some extent. However, even 
after relaxing restrictions on rationality to include such social aspects of human behaviour, the 
unpleasant situation remains that detrimental environmental effects occur. Even after taking 
into account the social nature of behaviour, the wrong choices still are made so often that 
environmental problems result.  
 
On the basis of these theoretical deliberations, sometimes named the ‘field model’, we can 
now specify what environmental policy instruments should do. They should: 
- avoid external effects on the environment and thus save collective goods, here 
environmental quality 
- avoid  the tragedy of the commons 
- solve the prisoners dilemma 
- prevent the free rider problem. 
 
Following the model, we can also indicate the mechanisms policy instruments may be aimed 
at. Focussing on a single actor, the correction on his behaviour can be brought about in a 
number of ways (see Bressers and Klok 1988 for a fuller treatment). 
 
1. The set of available alternatives can be changed. This can either be done by offering new 
alternatives, like separate collection facilities; by removing alternatives physically, as 
when fencing nature areas; or by improving knowledge on already existing but yet 
unknown alternatives, as with nature education programmes.   
2. The consequences of alternatives can be changed. This may be done positively, as when 
giving subsidies for lead free petrol, or negatively, e.g., by menacing jail or penalty to 
somebody dumping toxic wastes. 
3. The evaluation of consequences of alternatives can be changed. This can be done by 
changing the value system of actors, through educational processes, or by improving their 
active knowledge on the consequences of given alternatives, as for example with 
ecolabelling schemes. 
By these three types of mechanisms of a policy instrument, the external effects on the 
collective good might be avoided, as would the prisoners dilemma and the free rider 
problem.  However, in many situations, this is possible to a limited extent only and the 
situation still might be that of the prisoners dilemma, with the free riding option lurking. If 
heavy industries would be brought to reducing their CO2 emissions substantially by a large 
number of specific measures, the prisoners dilemma would remain for all other actions, where 
free riding is the norm. In addition, the non-heavy industries would still be riding free. Thus, 
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there is another role of policy instrument in avoiding the tragedy of the commons, by solving 
the prisoners dilemma. 
4. Rightful trust in everybody’s positive and due contribution to our common good can be 
created. This would make free riding virtually impossible. Here, the individual may seem 
to be deciding alone. In fact, however, he is making his decisions as if he were the 
collectivity, deciding for all together simultaneously. This co-operative solution is a most 
direct option for solving environmental problems, with collective values being internalised 
in individual decision making. This option seems highly idealistic but it is a normal 
solution to many problems, at least in small communities. Tasks for the common good are 
executed, that is, behaviour is adjusted, because one expects everybody to do so. Still, this 
ideal is not always reached even if only a small number of people are involved, as can be 
seen in some families where children (or parents) try to avoid the daily dishwashing 
duties, always with good reasons at hand.  
 
What are the requirements for this type of co-operative behaviour? One element would be that 
free riders are sanctioned for free riding, when they are caught. This would mean that the bad 
behaviour is forbidden at the level of the individual, and no co-operative approach is required. 
However, control and sanctions may be more informal, not involving police and 
administration but friends and family, or the neighbours next door. Another prerequisite is 
that the behavioural norm is clear and non-commitment is visible.  
1.6 Evaluation criteria for policy  instruments 
The analysis of how instruments for environmental policy work is one part of policy 
instrumentation, indispensable for any evaluation. But what are the criteria for judging policy 
instruments? The framework for the evaluation of instruments (and related policies) mirrors 
the empirical analysis. The empirical analysis ultimately is to indicate effects in terms of these 
criteria. This adds a layer of analysis of a normative and political nature. As it is 
consequences of  instruments which are taken as the basis of evaluation, the approach is that 
of consequentialism, not in the narrow sense of a utilitarian type of economism, but in the 
broad sense given to this term by Sen (2000). In this broad view, consequences may 
incorporate the preferences of individuals, as is exclusively the case with utilitarianism, but 
may also cover collective aspects like ‘sustainability’  Virtually all criteria for evaluation as 
specified below belong to this second group, see Table 2. 
 
Sustainability may be an agreed upon general goal, as in many countries it already is. Its 
specification is normative and political. Environmental effectiveness of instruments will be 
another indisputable part of instrument evaluation. However, at what level of detail is this 
effectiveness to be established, taking into account which mechanisms and which time 
horizon? Is there a right to some minimal quality everywhere, with permits as possibly most 
apt instruments, or is some overall level of emission reduction enough, with taxes as an 
adequate instrument? Are cost-effectiveness and efficiency important parameters for 
judgement, as for most people costs will be important?  Or are distributional effects more 
relevant for instrument choice? Are economic and environmental effects abroad to be taken 
into account, or only national ones? Do other aspects of justice, like the right to pollute versus 
the right not to be polluted, play a role in instrument choice? Is freedom of choice by 
producers and consumers an independent criterion for judgement? 
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Even if one would refrain from normative choices in these respects, one still meets the same 
questions as empirical ones in developing and implementing policies. Other people will mind 
about distributional effects, people abroad do mind about being polluted, and there is a 
general acceptance of a broadly defined polluter-pays-principle, implying that the one  who 
pollutes should bear kept responsible for this consequence of his actions. If people judge 
policies as going against their values, the legitimacy of these instruments will be reduced, as 
will be their effectiveness. No doubt, the normative acceptability of instruments is one main 
empirical factor in both their political relevancy and in their environmental effectiveness. 
Thus, through the backdoor, the normative questions come in again.  
 
When lead-free petrol came on the market - at a slightly higher price than leaded petrol, with 
an accompanying government action ‘buy green petrol’ - the reaction of many was that if they 
would buy green, they would be part of a minority taking the costs while the main problem 
would remain unsolved. In that way, buying green would have limited or even negative 
effectiveness combined with an unjust sharing of burdens. On the basis of their normative 
appraisal, many regulatees decided not to co-operate, forcing government to use other policy 
instruments. Straightforward product rules could then be the preferred option, for this 
normative reason.  
The Dutch government solved this collective action dilemma differently, by making leaded 
petrol more expensive through a tax measure, which is equivalent to taxing lead. Thus, leaded 
petrol was pressed off the market effectively. Now everybody paid the higher price of lead-
free petrol. In this solution, burdens for environmental improvements are shared equally, in 
the sense that everybody pays the same price per litre. This is in line with one of several 
justice criteria, which states that the effort for a certain amount of environmental 
improvement should be the same for everybody, at the margin. It is not an equal effort per 
head, as those who drive most pay most. This criterion happens to be nearly equivalent with 
the criterion of (static) economic efficiency (Baumol and Oates, 1988).   
 
It would, of course, be strange if criteria for judging environmental policy would be different 
from those valid for other policies. So, the criteria are related to general views on what the 
tasks of government are. The combination of neo-liberal and socio-democratic views then 
covers the field, with different emphasis on different aspects with different political groups, 
but grosso modo with the same ingredients. Giddens compares the new consensus being 
formulated on tasks for public policy to more traditional views. They are very much related to 
structural developments in the economy, with global markets and international networks 
replacing command and control in firms. The emphasis in policy is also shifting from 
‘control'’ to ‘generative policies’, which allow “individuals and groups to make things 
happen, rather than have things happen to them, in the context of overall social concerns and 
goals” (Giddens, 1994:15). The value of equality shifts from distributional equality, in 
disposable income, to generative equality, in terms of security, self-respect and self-
realisation (ibid: 1994:191). Developments in environmental policy instruments are part of 
these broader societal developments, unavoidably. 
 
What are the criteria to use in judgement, for practical assessment of instruments? For 
environmental policy, the first criterion probably is effectiveness in environmental terms. In 
integrative policies, however, effectiveness cannot be established disregarding other values. 
How important is the toxic effect on child development as compared to cancer risks on a 
much longer time scale, and as compared to the loss of plant species that might have had a 
pharmaceutical importance? The time scale of effects requires choices on the relative 
importance of future effects. The specific location of effects may not only influence their type 
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and magnitude but involves different social groups as well. The spatial distribution also 
relates on how effects abroad should be taken into account at home. Should national policies 
also aim at effects abroad as part of overall effectiveness? Current WTO regulations go 
against such considerations. And how to deal with low-chance high-impacts effects, where 
evaluating effectiveness is based on the degree to which risk avoidance or precaution is 
deemed important?  
 
Next to environmental effectiveness, there are other values. A first and broadly accepted one 
is costs, or better: welfare effects in terms of production losses required for environmental 
improvements. Instruments  which help stimulate environmental technology development, 
like economic market based instruments, will have lower costs in the long run (see for 
theoretical aspects Baumol and Oates 1988 and for empirical aspects Hemmelskamp 1997). 
So a clear distinction is to be made in the cost criterion between short term costs (st) and long 
term costs (lt). In multi-purpose instruments, the environmental cost-effectiveness (or ‘eco-
efficiency’) can only be established by attributing one part of cost to environmental goals and 
other parts to each of the other objectives contributed to. Other values relate to ethical 
categories of justice and equality, covering traditional distributional justice within and 
between generations, justice as fairness, and the newer generative equality (see on these 
ethical issues Rawls 1972 and Giddens 1994/98). Intergenerational justice has been made 
operational in an environmental context as ‘sustainability’ in the Brundtland Report of 1987. 
 
However broad one models effects of environmental policy instruments, there always will 
remain relevant aspects beyond modelling, not to be left out of account, but to be specified as 
second order or as strategic criteria (see Table 2). Government has to operate with some 
legitimacy, which means that on average, some minimal level of social and political 
acceptability and support is required in instrument application. Furthermore, instruments have 
to fit more or less to the capacities of the existing administration. Large changes in sectoral 
competitiveness may create social instability and should better be avoided, in general. 
Another element, lacking in most quantified models, is how instruments influence technology 
development. These aspects, partly overlapping, are hardly quantifiable. Still, they may be 
essential for a well-founded judgement on environmental policy instruments.  
 
 
Table 2  Criteria for evaluating policy instruments 
 
First order criteria Second order criteria Strategic criteria 
effectiveness 
social costs (st; lt)  
eco-efficiency 
distributive justice        
       -intragenerational 
       -intergenerational 
justice as fairness 
‘generative equality’ 
 
social and political 
acceptability 
within administrative 
capacities  
limited changes in 
competitiveness 
incentive for sustainable 
technology development  
fitting in the broader 
conceptual framework for 
public policy 
fitting in the broader institu-
tional framework of society 
fitting in general cultural 
developments 
fitting in general economic 
developments  
 
 
Instrument choice may bind society for years and decades. Hence, such choices are to be 
placed in a strategic context, not only reckoning with relations as they are now, but also with 
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developments as are taking place in this longer time perspective. Four main strategic areas 
may be distinguished, related to politics, social structure, economy, and culture: 
1. Instruments are to fit in the broader conceptual framework for public policy, e.g., along 
the lines sketched by Giddens (1998).  
2. They should be in line with the broader institutional framework of society, e.g., in terms 
of increased mobility, functional specialisation of organisations and internationalisation of 
organisations.  
3. They should consider general cultural developments as in individualisation,  mass culture 
and other-directedness, as sketched by many sociological studies.  
4. Finally, instruments are to be adapted to general economic developments, as in 
globalisation of markets, shifts from hierarchical co-ordination to network co-ordination, 
and shifts from production of commodities to production of services, as sketched by 
Castells (1996).  
 
Some people, especially economists, simplify the evaluation by reducing it to an economic 
analysis. In principle, such an assessment may cover all environmental effects, is based on a 
specific discount rate, uses a risk avoidance factor of zero, takes an equal weight for every 
Euro or dollar - thus disregarding income distribution -, and only reckons with current private 
preferences. They assume independence between effects and independence between 
individual preferences. Then, indeed, each emission or environmental intervention has an 
environmental price tag in terms of a (negative) net present value, as part of social costs. 
Environmental policy instruments then can be scored in one unit: money. This overall score is 
the sum of the environmental effects, after their transformation into a net present value as 
sketched above, and the direct economic (market related) effects. The one Euro or dollar 
figure resulting then indicates which instrument to use in which situation.  
 
In reality this hypothetical situation, of course, does not exist. Where price tags can be put on 
emissions, these prices relate to partial effects and will mostly be based on not very realistic 
assumptions. Several aspects of justice, such as equality and justice as fairness, are left out or 
included only superficially. Moreover, second order and strategic criteria are not all apt for 
economic quantification. Therefore, this option is too narrow to be the sole base for a 
convincing instrument assessment, although costs of course play a role in such an assessment.  
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The main lines of argument in this section can be summarised as follows: 
The prime role of policy instruments is in reducing social complexity to 
manageable proportions. 
Instruments as institutional arrangements may not only be seen as tools of 
governments to influence private behaviour, but also as means for guiding 
behavioural relations between public bodies, and between individuals and private 
organisations. 
Environmental problems mainly result from external effects economic activities 
have on collective goods.  
Environmental policy instruments  help avoid the tragedy of the commons by 
solving the prisoners’ dilemma and preventing the free rider problem. 
The evaluation of instruments for environmental policy is not only based on first 
order criteria for evaluation of effects, like eco-efficiency and distributive justice. It 
also involves second order criteria, like effects on competitiveness and influence on 
technology development, and third order strategic criteria, like fitting in with 
general institutional, cultural and economic developments. 
 
 
2 DESIGN, ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
Having set out the role of environmental policy instruments and the criteria for their 
evaluation, the next question is how to specify and assess them. It should be clear by now that 
there is not one unique way for doing so. Therefore, there is no final choice made here on how 
instruments should be categorised. Many dimensions have their due place and not all of them 
can be included at the same level. Instead, a choice for four “main” dimensions is made. 
Together they specify the central aspects of instruments. Using these as a framework, a 
number of instrument types are being surveyed. The close link between policy instruments, 
the policy preparation and policy implementation process is worked out in a separate section. 
The ultimate ratio for policy instruments lies with what they produce. The evaluation is the 
final section of this second part of the chapter. The relations between the elements of this 
chapter are surveyed in Figure 3 below.  
2.1 Categorisation of instruments 
Instruments as societal ordering mechanisms bring order in the relations between actors and 
guide the behaviour of actors in relation to the environmental purpose or goal of the 
instrument. What is common to all environmental policy instruments is that they are thought 
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to bring about a change in behaviour as compared to the behaviour without application of the 
instrument. These behavioural adjustments are aimed at improved environmental quality; that 
is what makes them instruments of environmental policy.  
 
In specifying instruments, we discern four main types of characteristics or dimensions. In 
question form they are:  
1. Who influences whom? 
2. What is the influencing mechanism? 
3. What is being influenced? 
4. What is the operational goal? 
 
These four empirical dimensions are quite general; in principle, they are the same all over the 
world, regardless of cultural differences. In addition, in principle, these four types of 
characteristics can be analysed more or less independently. Some further instrument 
characteristics, however, seem more bound to specific cultures and institutions. An example is 
the juridical status, often used as a defining characteristic. Juridical categories are linked to 
the specificity of judicial systems. For instance, an EU regulation does not have a pendent in 
most other countries, while Anglo-Saxon statutory law is not present in most European and 
(ex) communist countries.  
 
The general tasks of instruments - avoiding the tragedy of the commons, solving the 
prisoners dilemma and preventing the free rider problem - could easily have been made into 
defining characteristics. They have not been included here because of their rather abstract and 
strategic nature. Hence, they play a role still in instrument design and instrument evaluation, 
be it in general or at a case level. The normative evaluation criteria as specified in the 
previous section have not been included here either, making a distinction between empirical-
descriptive elements and the normative evaluation. Of course, there is to be a link between 
descriptive elements and evaluation, as ultimately it is the evaluation that counts. In the 
evaluation, it is not only the direct effects of the instruments that count; it is the overall effects 
that are the proof of the pudding. There is a tendency to include some standardised effect 
mechanisms into policy instruments, like global warming potential (GWP) in national and 
international climate policy. So some mechanism may play a role in the goal as specified in 
the instrument. Most mechanisms, however, will be independent from the instrument. 
Therefore, their analysis is required, as a separate step, in the evaluation of  policy 
instruments.  
 
It seems that the four dimensions discerned above cover the main aspects of policy 
instruments, being relevant for evaluation either directly, or indirectly, through some sort of 
empirical modelling. The ultimate integration of the evaluation in the instrument would 
safeguard the right instrumentation but would make the instrument as complex as effect 
analysis and evaluation is by now. Some steps in this direction have recently been taken, 
using standardised environmental effect mechanisms and standardised evaluation procedures, 
as in using life cycle assessment (LCA) for selecting cost effective emission reduction 
measures in the oil and gas producing industry in the Netherlands. For instruments 
influencing decentralised decisions, as seem to be increasingly required, a further 
development of instruments in this direction is essential, not only covering effect mechanisms 
but also their evaluation in terms of relative importance of different effects. 
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We will now fill in the four main dimensions chosen for further elaboration. It should be clear 
that also at this level, there is not one truth. For instance, one can describe ‘actors’ in many 
dimensions, not only as individuals but also as collective units, as organisations. What is 
guiding the choices? In the end, the question is to be answered how policy instruments can 
fulfil their function in simplifying the complexities of reality to allow for effective and 
concerted actions towards environmental goals. More specifically, the question relates to how 
instruments can be set up and how their functioning can be evaluated. As we already have 
four dimensions, a further systematic detailing should be sparse, as otherwise too many 
categories would result.  
Who influences whom? 
When asking who is influencing whom, a major distinction can be made between 
governments on the one hand and non-governmental actors, like individuals, firms, and 
organisations on the other. These two types of actors involved in instrument application lead 
to a first further categorisation of instruments. A distinction is thus made between three types 
of actor relations, see Table 3. 
 
Table 3  Actor relations 
Actor relations       Examples 
Governments (G) influencing 
   Private actors (P) 
environmental permits 
SO2 emission charges 
Governments (G) influencing  
   Governments (G) 
Montreal Protocol 
EU regulations 
Private actors (P) influencing  
   Private actors (P) 
ISO 14 000 Series 
private certification systems 
 
 
An environmental permit is a main instrument where governments influence private actors 
(including publicly owned firms), as are emission taxes, e.g., SO2 taxes creating a market 
incentive for reducing SO2 emissions. An international treaty like the Montreal Protocol on 
substances that deplete the ozone layer is a binding instrument between governments, and an 
EU environmental regulation binds national governments in the EU. An ISO 14 001 audit 
guarantees a degree of generality in describing environmental performance of firms, creating 
an incentive to take environmental aspects seriously. Private certification systems, such as for 
food in supermarkets, influence the behaviour of food producers and create options for choice 
for consumers.  
 
We will use the three main types of actor relations in structuring the presentation of the 
instruments in this chapter, as political-administrative instruments (A), regulatory instruments 
(B), and social instruments (C), see Figure 1. 
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What is the influencing mechanism? 
The influencing mechanism specifies how one actor influences the other. It involves the 
limitation, prescription or the addition of options; mechanisms which influence the outcomes 
of options, as in market influence; mechanisms which lead to a different evaluation of 
outcomes, as through information; and mechanisms which work through institutional changes 
in the surroundings of regulatees, like liability rules. The focus is on the influencing 
mechanism (Table 4, next page). Ultimate effects, e.g., of changes in liability rules, will 
usually work through further effect chains, like market mechanisms and the creation of 
options with lower liability risks. Specific procedural instruments, in principle part of the 
institutions of society, are taken separately here, leaving only the more general institutional 
aspects in the structural instrument mechanism. The terminology used in practice varies 
somewhat. For instance, binding instruments, covering the limitation and prescription of 
options, are also named direct instrument or juridical instruments. This does not seem handy, 
however, as option creation can be seen as a direct instrument as well and financial 
instruments like emission taxes also have a distinct juridical status. 
What is being influenced? 
A further basic characteristic is the nature of the influenced object. Is it a material object, like 
a chemical compound, a material, a product or an installation; or is the object of regulation an 
activity or process, like the way an incinerator is operated, the speed of cars, the leakage 
prevention in refrigerator repairs, or the concentration of a substance as emitted?  
Regulating  ‘things’ is not done because of the inherent properties of the material object.  
Figure 1  Categorising environmental policy instruments based on actor  
relations 
 
B 
C 
G G 
P P 
A  Political-administrative instruments  
 
 
B  Regulatory instruments 
 
 
C  Social instruments  
B 
A 
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Table 4 A typology of instrument mechanisms 
Instrument mechanisms Examples 
binding instruments, prohibiting   prohibiting: no cadmium stabiliser in PVC as 
building material is allowed 
binding instruments, prescriptive communities offer the option of separate 
waste collection 
option creation multiple waste containers for separate 
collection 
market influence (volume or price   volume: auctioned car ownership rights 
price: energy tax, SO2 tax 
cultural/informational  normative: ecolabel 
information: explain contribution of organic 
solvents to summer smog 
structural/institutional influences liability rules 
public decision making safeguards 
procedural influence obligatory environmental officer in firm 
ISO 14 001 audit 
 
 
Ultimately, it is only processes, as activities, which influence the environment through some 
sort of environmental intervention. Environmental policy instruments try to influence these 
activities directly, or indirectly, through material things. In general, regulating things is easier 
than regulating processes, as most things can be inspected and controlled any time, while 
control of behavioural aspects is much more complicated. Bypassing a flue gas purification 
installation, e.g., saves costs. Illegal bypassing can be stopped only if the inspector comes by 
at the right time. Cadmium in PVC stabilisers in building materials, however, can be 
measured any time. 
 
There are some boundary cases where it may not be so clear whether  the material object or 
the behaviour, as a process, is being regulated. For example, one may regulate the way the 
overflows of a sewer system are built, or how they are to function in terms of the allowable 
amount of overflow per occurrence and period. The first instrument type regulates the 
material installation, the second one the process. Such descriptions may easily be combined.  
 
Another example at the boundary is where a certain installation may not emit more than a 
certain amount of some hazardous substance. In such a case, it is not so much a regulation of 
the thing but of the activity. An emission tax is regulating an activity, as it is the emission 
flow from some class of activities that is being regulated. The same is true for more complex 
emission regulations like a maximum amount of NOx per kWh of electricity produced in a 
certain type of power installation. In permits for installations, one may both regulate the 
installation as a thing, and one may regulate its functioning.  
 
A final boundary case is where process information is linked to a product. Timber wood, as a 
product, may be labelled as originating from a sustainably managed forest. The process aspect 
“in the chain” then is labelled on the product. Similarly, LCA information on products refers 
to all processes implied in having the product. In these real boundary cases, it seems easiest to 
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treat such instruments as product policy. A final example is on information for sustainable life 
styles. Though referring to the consumption processes, it focuses so much on purchasing of 
products, that also such an instrument may best be labelled as a product instrument.   
 
A second main element in what constitutes the object of an instrument is how encompassing 
the object is defined. The instrument may apply to single items or to classes of items. 
Operating permits, e.g., apply to single installations. Rules on specific single products seem to 
be limited to immovables. General rules on technologies apply to classes of installations. 
Furthermore, the geographical applicability of an instrument may be limited. ISO norms have 
a global applicability, while most technology rules apply at the national level only. 
Behavioural rules may have a broad applicability, as with general speed limits for buses, or 
they may have a  limited domain, as with denied access after sunset for a specific protected 
nature area.  The main grouping of object types in instruments thus ranges from single mobile 
products (including installations and objects like nature areas); single immobile products; 
classes of products at a regional level; classes of products at a global level; classes of 
activities at a regional level; to classes of activities at a global level. 
 
Table 5  A typology of influenced objects 
Object influenced Examples 
single product              (mobile) cars/buses/trains/aircraft 
single product, including instal-
lations and objects   (immobile) 
test on fittingness of building  in landscape  
permit requiring safety valve on specific pressure 
vessel 
classes of products, regional  EU obligatory 3-way catalytic converters in cars 
rules on treatment of toxic wastes 
classes of products, global WTO rules on non-discrimination 
classes of activities, regional  rules on NOx concentrations from household boilers 
classes of activities, global ISO 14 001 requirements on environmental planning 
in firms 
 
What is the operational goal? 
The aims of instruments will always be in terms of some environmental quality or 
improvement, at reasonable sacrifices in social and economic terms, often taken together as 
‘sustainability’ or sustainable development. Such aims usually are not embodied in 
instruments, as they cannot easily be specified and controlled. However, whatever ultimate 
aim was in mind when setting up the instrument, it is the operational goal only that works.  
 
If, for instance, resource use and emissions reductions are the aims, and the operational goal 
in an instrument for reaching these aims is a minimum recycling percentage of packaging 
waste, the link between the aims and the operational goal is not so direct. Only the recycling 
goal is operational and can to some extent be reached. In how far this goal attainment also 
contributes to sustainability depends on many empirical relations. Concrete answers also 
depend on the way these empirical relations are analysed, with legitimate but differing 
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methods of analysis existing. There may be a large difference between direct effects at the 
locus of implementation; indirect effects as linked effects in the chain; and more complex 
secondary effects involving longer effect chains and feedback loops. Therefore, linking aims 
of instruments to their operational goals is not a straightforward affair.  
 
As a rule, the closer one regulates to what ultimately is important, the less ‘noise’ and costs 
will be induced. If, for instance, car emissions are the problem, their regulation, if feasible, is 
a better option than regulating the weight of a car, although on average the latter is a 
reasonable indicator of emissions. If only this indicator is influenced by some instrument, cars 
will get lighter but not necessarily cleaner in the same proportion. So the goal regulated may 
range from products and installations to emissions.  
 
Environmental interventions may be grouped according to their characteristics further along 
their causal chains in the environment. Several emissions may, for example, be taken together 
in terms of their global warming potential (GWP). One may even follow that line further and 
quantify several emissions in terms of an abstract entity like ‘overall evaluation of effects’, as 
in some eco-indicator score. One further step towards linking the object of analysis to ultimate 
evaluation criteria is to combine the environmental score with a socio-economic variable like 
cost or expenses. The goal of the instrument then is in terms of an entity like eco-efficiency or 
environmental cost-effectiveness. 
 
So the question is: where in the effect chain is the operational goal in the instrument to be set?  
When environmental policy started to expand in the 1970s, effect mechanisms usually were 
quite direct, as problems were largely local. If a flue gas purification installation was required 
in a permit, the direct effects were quite clear, and the indirect effects in society were limited. 
The reasons for requiring the cleaning up of the flue gas were also quite clear, and explicit 
modelling of environmental effects was hardly necessary. The improvements through end-of-
pipe measures were obvious and often locally visible. These simple times, however, have 
mostly passed in the last decades of active environmental policy; things have become more 
complex now.  
 
Process integrated improvements not only have specifiable local effects on the environment in 
terms of local resource use, local emissions and other local environmental interventions. They 
also have effects on all economic inputs and outputs. Hence, consequences of policy induced 
change can in many cases be established only by following the chains of indirectly linked 
products and processes, each with its own set of local environmental interventions elsewhere. 
And this is only a first step. There also are secondary mechanisms as related to market 
adjustments, influences on R&D, on long term competitiveness, on other regulatory measures, 
on cultural views, etc. In analysing not only direct effects, there is thus a continuum, starting 
at relatively simple primary effects in the chain and going to an ever increasing complexity of 
secondary effects; ultimately until the boundary of what can be analysed. 
 
Primary mechanisms in the environment are relatively simple mostly, although recent climate 
models, e.g., are of quite complex nature already. Models with broader secondary 
mechanisms, though more adequate in principle, are still rare and usually have a limited 
validity. For a more complex problem such as climate change, the secondary environmental 
effects are intermingled with social reactions. For instance, coastal areas may be flooded by 
sea level rise, but sea defences can be improved to prevent this. So the effects of instruments 
for climate policy can be analysed practically up to climate forcing, possibly involving some 
ecological feed back loops. Beyond that, modelling becomes more subjective.  
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It is clear that in defining the goal of instruments, it is hardly possible to include all secondary 
effects. Some instruments do not even specify the primary chain effects in society, like most 
technology rules. Where governments specify rules on technologies like, for instance, on the 
catalytic converter for cars, one may assume that in the preparatory phase the analysis has 
been extended to include primary and secondary effects in the chain. Other instruments do 
take into account only direct effects, like the emissions from a regulated facility, as is the case 
with the permit for installations. Where decisions on technologies are made at a decentral 
level, as is increasingly the case, one needs a more comprehensive view of the ultimate effects 
of technology choices. So the most indirect instruments involve the largest complexity, first 
including mechanisms and effects in society, then those in the environment, and finally the 
overall evaluation of these consequences, to allow for rational decisions. There are strong 
mechanisms that prevent such an ideal state of affairs, related to the collective nature of 
environmental quality. 
 
When specifying goals, it should be clear that instruments cannot control the full extent of all 
real effect mechanisms. The creation of direct effects unavoidably leads to indirect primary 
effects in the chain and to long or everlasting secondary effects in society and the 
environment. Policy actions may often change the situation forever. When evaluating 
instruments, the primary and  secondary effects in the chain should surely be included, in 
principle. The question however is in how far such effect mechanisms can be included in 
instrument modelling in practice.  
To some extent, it certainly can, as in LCA inventory modelling. Incorporated in an 
instrument like a covenant as is the case in Germany and the Netherlands in waste prevention, 
the modelling results should not be confused with state of the art modelling of real effects (as 
sometimes happens). The standardised modelling in the instruments is a proxy, which may 
improve on other ways of regulating technologies or single products that do not take into 
account effect mechanisms at all.   
 
In real world situations, things sometimes are less complicated than theoretically perceived, 
and then environmental policy instruments may be simpler as well. For example, when 
banning a toxic and persistent agrochemical for which slightly more expensive alternatives 
are available, the real effect route in the economy does hardly have primary and secondary 
effects in the chain, and neither is there much complexity in the environmental pathways 
towards valued endpoints in terms of human and ecotoxic effects. There then is no reason to 
complicate the instrument and burden it with complex effect mechanisms and evaluations. A 
simple prohibition of the agrochemical will do, after a relatively simple analysis of effect 
chains in the policy formation process, including a view on alternatives. Such easy pieces 
have mostly been performed, however. After more than thirty years of active environmental 
policy, it seems that simple end-of-pipe (add-on) measures and simple product prohibitions 
have mostly been enacted. Such policies may now start to hamper environmental progress by 
fixing old technologies. The problem now remaining is more complicated and hence requires 
a more complicated instrumentation as well. 
 
For integrated policy instruments there is a gap between what modelling can do more or less 
realistically, and what is needed for integration in overall evaluation. Somehow, the modelled 
multitude of environmental interventions and other effects are to be transformed into an 
overall judgement, even though secondary effect mechanisms are hardly modelled and valued 
endpoints hence cannot be modelled realistically in most instances. Several methods for this 
purpose are available which do the undoable. Economists derive overall evaluations in 
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monetary terms on the basis of past behaviour. Impact assessment in LCA first integrates in 
terms of policy themes and then through a weighting procedure into an overall assessment. 
For reasons of policy consistency, it would be necessary to use the same trick every time. 
There is a modest requirement on overall rationality of environmental policy. It is that the 
trade-off between different effects of each policy act is equal. This simple requirement can be 
transformed in a conditional statement (see von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953): if policies 
are rational, there is a single set of weights on effects which can “explain” all policy choices 
made. Given the theoretical and practical limitations on modelling, policy integration can only 
be reached through practical choices, based on  not fully developed arguments. 
 
One would like to go one step further and require that a practical method is a reasonable 
predictor of overall effects, as are yet unknown. This clearly poses a methodological problem. 
What one can do is to strive for a consistent and transparent solution, on the one hand taking 
into account real mechanisms as are known (partially only), and on the other hand to specify 
the normative background of the evaluation. This problem area, it seems, has not yet been 
under real scientific scrutiny. Some practical solutions are available, like using a panel (e.g., 
NOGEPA covenant), using policy aims for weighing emissions into one score (e.g., Swiss or 
Norwegian ecopoints), using a mix of partial economic valuation or some equivalency factors 
(e.g. ExternE and EPS), and applying some preferences or value types (e.g., Eco-indicator 
1999).  
 
All these practical models have been developed in small scale hardly peer reviewed studies. 
Important questions are only touched upon and not answered. How can we differentiate 
between reversible effects, like ecosystem degradation, and irreversible effects, like species 
extinction? Particularly: how can we differentiate between small-chance-high-risk effects, as 
in possible runaway effects in climate change, as against more probable slow change 
scenarios? Assuming uncertainties can be specified in terms of risk, how can we evaluate 
these options with different probabilities? How can we make a comparative evaluation of 
climate change effects, which can hardly be specified in economic (welfare) terms as against 
effects of acidification in terms of reduced crop yields and increased corrosion, which can 
quite well be specified in terms of economic losses? Such fundamental problems have not yet 
been solved. There also is no coherent research programme so far dealing with these subjects 
so essential for decentralised decision making as is required in environmental policy 
instruments for the next decades. 
 
For specifying operational goals, there are two main dimensions. 
 
Complexity of the causal chains: 
direct effects  indirect effects:  
  primary effects  secondary effects 
   
Place in the effect/evaluation chain: 
technology  intervention  policy theme  ecoindicator  evaluated total effect 
 
There is a gliding scale from direct effects through indirect effects to secondary effects, taking 
into account ever more complex causal relations. Full secondary effects include complex feed 
back mechanisms, like the reactions of producers on changed prices due to changes in 
demand. These two dimensions cannot be combined independently. It does not make sense, 
e.g., to specify goals at a technical level based on secondary effects, as in most cases 
knowledge on secondary effects is limited or fully lacking. It then is better to use more simple 
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but operationally modelled relations than none. Most analytical tools like substance flow 
analysis (SFA), life cycle assessment (LCA) and environmentally extended input/output 
analysis (envIOA) are based on very simple indirect relations only, thus allowing for an 
operational analysis, albeit each  with limited validity. Taking this state of affairs for granted, 
the classification may be reduced to a simpler typology as in the table below. The option of 
using secondary effects as instrument goals, e.g., based on some economic model, seems not 
to have been applied yet. It also seems not so logical to combine a highly integrated goal in 
terms of an eco-indicator with only direct effects, although technically this is possible. Also 
this last option has been left out of account. Applying this reduction the simplified typology 
of table 6 results. 
 
Table 6 Typology of operational goals in environmental policy 
Operational goals Examples 
direct technical 
characteristics 
binding rule: obligatory double skin in oil tankers (in most 
European and US harbours) 
technical 
characteristics in the 
chain 
requirements on recycling percentages of drink containers in 
take-back legislation (in several European countries) 
direct environmental 
interventions 
noise based landing fees in airports, as social instrument 
goal permit, with allowable emissions, as regulatory 
instrument (several OECD countries) 
indirect environmental  
interventions  
SFA based regulation of cadmium use in products 
(Netherlands) 
direct theme scores emission reduction targets for member countries (EU; Kyoto 
Protocol) 
indirect theme scores LCA based rules for waste prevention (Germany, Netherlands) 
indirect eco-indicator 
scores 
building regulations as being prepared for a limited set of eco-
indicators (Netherlands, in prep) 
indirect total effect 
scores 
Eco-efficiency as selection criterion for emission reducing 
technical measures, is in NOGEPA covenant 
secondary (total, etc) 
effect scores 
(no example yet?) 
 
 
2.2 Instrument design 
Environmental policy instruments may best be set up by choosing the characteristics most 
relevant for the individual case. What exactly is the case is not so easy to say, however, as it is 
both defined by the context and by the choices made in instrument design. These reflective 
relations make instrument design a much less rational-mechanical activity than at first sight 
might seem possible. If, for instance, one first defines the ecological effects of over-
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nutrification as a manure problem, and then the manure problem as a consequence of too 
many animals per hectare, the choice for regulating per farm seems logical. In addition, if one 
has the traditional permit in mind, the problem will be defined more easily this way. By 
contrast, if the problem is defined in terms of a lack of oligotrophic areas, or as a lack of 
spread of nutrient concentrations, a regional scope in regulation will be more logical.  
 
If one would have an instrument option in mind like a substance deposit (see Huppes 1988), 
the scale of the problem could well be defined at a regional level. Then the choice for 
individual permits does not seem as logical. This is to say, that it is not only the empirical 
context that indicates choices; further normative considerations may well play a role. The 
polluter-pays-principle reflects the normative principle that the one who pollutes is to pay for 
the consequences of his action - and for the costs of preventing them, as is the case in liability 
law in all Western countries. Tradable permits lead to the prevention costs being borne by the 
polluter, but not the damages. In this respect, the emission tax is more in line with general 
social and juridical considerations than the tradable permit. If filled in as a regional substance 
deposit, the focus on individual emitters vanishes more or less fully. With these caveats in 
mind, we now turn to design choices in instrumentation. 
 
A policy instrument may be defined by combining elements from the four basic instrument 
dimensions discussed above. These characteristics are rather independent, so they may be 
used as a framework for instrument development: as an instrument generator. Any 
combination defines the main lines of an instrument. In Figure 2, the instrument generator, 
some examples are given.  
 
Take, for instance, ‘social instrument’ from the column actor relations; use ‘market 
influence’ in terms of pricing from the set of instrument mechanisms; take ‘classes of 
products’ from the set of objects influenced; and take ‘direct interventions’ from the set of 
operational goals. (This is instrument: “III; 3; e; ã”).   
 
This instrument then can be further specified as to the product classes: e.g., ‘aircraft’, with 
different noise levels as the operational goal in pricing. ‘Noise related airport landing fees’ are 
a quite common social instrument. The motivation behind a social instrument may be another 
policy instrument, especially a regulatory one. It may be ‘a binding instruments of a 
prohibiting nature; for a single immobile facility; with direct intervention as an operational 
goal’. In the example here, the motivation-creating regulatory instrument is: “the operating 
permit of the airport stating maximum noise levels in surrounding residential areas”.  The 
motivation behind the regulatory instrument may be based on a political-administrative 
instrument, e.g., an EU directive on permissible noise levels in residential areas. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
actor relations 
I regulatory 
instruments  
 
II political-
administrative 
instruments 
III social 
instruments 
 
instrument 
mechanisms 
1a binding instruments 
prohibiting 
1b binding instruments 
prescriptive 
2 option creation 
 
3 market influence 
(volume or price)                 
4 cultural/ 
informational  
5 structural/ 
 institutional influences 
6 procedural influence 
 
 
 
 
 
objects influenced 
a single product 
 
b single immobile 
 or facility 
c single 
installation  
d classes of 
products, regional 
e classes of 
products, global 
f classes of 
activities, regional 
g classes of 
activities, global 
 
operational goals 
á direct technical 
characteristics 
â indirect system 
characteristics (in chain) 
ã direct environmental 
interventions 
ä indirect environmental 
interventions  
å direct theme scores 
æ indirect theme scores 
ç indirect ecoindicator 
scores 
è indirect total effect 
scores 
é (secondary 
environmental effect 
scores) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
noise component in airport landing fees (many airports, including 
Amsterdam Airport) 
extended liability for final toxic waste (Superfund US) 
international treaty on ozone layer depletion (Montreal Protocol) 
EXAMPLES: 
Figure 2  The instrument generator 
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2.3  A thousand instruments  
With three types of actor relations, seven instrument mechanisms, seven types of objects 
influenced and eight levels of operational goals (as specified in the instrument generator), 
more than two thousand instrument types could be distinguished. Of course, not all 
combinations will be relevant but even if only a hundred would be relevant, a lot would have 
to be evaluated. Reducing complexity, that is the task here.  
In addition, further dimensions are relevant, like the encompassing nature of instruments, their 
juridical and administrative set-up, and their communicative qualities. Such aspects may 
however be seen more as a matter of detailing, after setting out the main lines along the four 
dimensions. The evaluation criteria as developed in the previous section will help in 
specifying actual instrument design in a relevant way. So, with the kit as developed, the 
‘social engineer’ may start the job, formulating policy instruments and communicating the 
ones selected to relevant audiences, as one major step in policy design. 
 
We now come to the specification of a number of instruments, a partial specification of a 
selection of possible instruments. The first of the main characteristics distinguished above 
defines three main types of instruments: the regulatory instruments, the political-
administrative instruments, and the social instruments. When specifying these three main 
types of instruments, the question is which further characteristics to take into view. The 
choice probably is between the mechanism of implementation, the objects of regulation, and 
the goals incorporated in the instrument. Therefore, we can go either for the objects or for the 
mechanisms as there is no a priori reason to choose one or the other. Focussing on objects, we 
would have main types like products instruments; installation instruments; and activity 
instruments (with some further differentiation). Focussing on implementation mechanisms, 
we would have prohibiting/prescriptive instruments; market instruments; cultural instruments; 
structural instruments and procedural instruments.  
 
It seems that the implementation mechanisms are most commonly used, and also have a better 
inherent logic than the different object types. Therefore, we stick to these for the next level of 
specification of environmental policy instruments. This next level then is implementation. It is 
not the addressee but the entity about which the addressee is to do, not to do, or to change 
something. So, indirectly, the addressee is implied. The addressee is the person, functionary 
or organisation responsible for the object in some way. The addressee is not always clear and 
may be filled in in different ways; in that sense there also is a further addressee dimension. 
Pesticides, e.g., may be prohibited in their production, in their trade, in their sales or in their 
application, all to the same aim, to prevent their use and the emissions related to that. For an 
immobile installation, the range of options is limited to the person or entity responsible for its 
operation, usually but not always the owner, or a representing person or organisation.  
 
I Regulatory instruments (guiding regulator-regulatee relations) 
Regulatory instruments guide regulator – regulatee relations; they are the traditional 
environmental policy instruments.  
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1 binding instruments 
Binding instruments can be either prohibiting or prescriptive. Prohibiting instruments usually 
are conditional. Something is forbidden unless some requirements are fulfilled. In 
symmetrical situations, as with speed limits, the difference is small. 
 
The objects concerned are technological items, that is, the constitution and location of 
products and installations, or the functioning of products and installations:  
- General rules on products 
- General rules on installations  
- Permits for operating specific installations 
- General requirements on activities  
- Land use regulations and zoning laws 
2 option creating instruments 
Option creation can be direct, as in providing separate waste collection facilities to 
households, that voluntarily may separate their wastes.  More indirect types of policies can be 
in the form of subsidized technology development, as for mass produced solar cells. If 
competitive, such option creation can be sufficient to create an environmental technology 
shift, in this case towards renewable energy. There is no prescription or prohibition involved 
here. There is some overlap with informational instruments, as when making public the results 
of research on solar cells. 
3 market instruments  
Financial instruments 
- Taxes or charges, on ‘things’: On natural resources, materials, products, waste 
flows, emissions, theme scores, eco-indicators. Examples: electricity taxes, SO2 
emission taxes (or charges). 
- Subsidies, any form, including tax credits, on (not using) 'things': On natural 
resources, etc. 
- Deposit-refund systems, on ‘things’: On resources, substances, etc (policy-
induced) 
- Taxes or charges on ‘activities’: e.g., road pricing 
Market volume instruments (‘things’ only) 
- Tradable emission permits 
- Tradable production rights 
- Tradable product ownership permits, like car permits in Singapore 
4 cultural/informational instruments 
Non-compulsory structured information 
- Public ecolabelling schemes 
- Public certification of firms 
5 structural/institutional instruments 
- Extended liability 
- Good house keeping ownership rules 
- Educational system, Copernicus charter, etc. 
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6 procedural instruments  
- Covenants, voluntary agreements ‘in the shadow of the law’ 
- Environmental Impact Assessment rules  
- Obligatory information disclosure, as in the US Toxic Releases Inventory 
 
The special nature of procedural instruments may be indicated by an example from the 
Netherlands (see Huppes et al. 1997). In a covenant between the Dutch central government 
and NOGEPA (Netherlands Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Association), a given 
budget for environmental improvement was to be spent for a specified level of overall 
improvement in air emissions.  In the agreement, it was stipulated that specific measures were 
to be selected based on their eco-efficiency, with particular rules to establish the efficiency. 
For the economic analysis, usual costing methods were applied. The environmental analysis 
started with effects in society, based on LCA inventory modelling. The effects in the 
environment were specified in terms of policy themes. For establishing eco-efficiency, these 
theme scores were aggregated into one eco-indicator score, using covenant specific weights as 
established by all those concerned in the covenant. 
II  Political-administrative instruments (guiding relations between public bodies) 
Governments are restricted here to the regulatory part of government, engaged in planning, 
developing, implementing policies, and using policy instruments in such, here: environmental  
policies. Other operative public tasks, like building and maintaining roads, canals and dykes, 
maintaining an army, and distributing electricity, are productive or consumptive activities, to 
be regulated as any other economic activity. 
 
The relations between governments, as regulators, and private persons and organisations as 
regulatees, inmost cases are hierarchical. The relations between governments may be 
hierarchical as well, as when the EU binds the policies of countries with Directives, and 
national governments prescribe policies to regional and local governments. However, in the 
international context, most relations regarding environmental policies are horizontal, as in 
bilateral treaties and multinational treaties. Some hierarchy is implied when international 
public bodies are involved. In addition, when, seemingly, bilateral relations are involved, 
there may actually be a hierarchy involved. For instance, ‘joint implementation’ is dealt with 
at the interstate level; but the rules for joint implementation are dealt with in the Kyoto 
Protocol and the (future) extensions to that protocol as set up under UN leadership.  
In principle, the six main implementation mechanisms discussed above can apply. We will go 
through the options in terms of a number of examples. 
1 binding instruments 
International treaties and  conventions with binding elements in them like the Montreal 
Protocol, Kyoto Protocol, the Biosafety Protocol 
- EU Directives for member states 
2 option creating instruments 
- Clean development mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol. 
- Multilateral Ozone Fund under the Montreal Protocol. 
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These options seem to stretch the concept a bit. However, their basic set-up is to allow states 
to develop regulatory activities which would not be possible or at least rather unlikely without 
the explicit development of the option. 
3 market instruments 
- Internationally tradable emission reduction obligations 
4 cultural instruments 
- International guidelines, as by OECD, and in the EU IPPC/BAT (Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control/ Best Available Technology) rules 
- Rio Declaration, AGENDA 21 
- National guidelines for local zoning laws 
- ILO conventions regarding labour standards 
5 structural instruments 
- WTO rules 
6 procedural instruments 
- International Criminal Court (ICC) 
III  Social instruments (guiding relations between private actors) 
These instruments are similar to political administrative instruments in that they may reflect 
horizontal relations between equals, or have a hierarchical element in them. Again, there are  
the six main implementation mechanisms.  
1 binding instruments 
- Contractually specified rules for waste management, as when firms oblige themselves 
to deliver a certain amount of waste  for a longer period of time 
2 option creating instruments  
- Battery take-in in supermarkets 
3 market instruments 
- Noise related landing fees on airports 
- Deposit-refund system on cadmium containing rechargeable batteries for household 
appliances, on a voluntary basis. 
- In-firm tradable emission permits (see box) 
4 cultural instruments 
- Green marketing 
- Green accounting 
- Product sheets 
- Ecolabelling rules 
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5 structural instruments 
- Standard contracts specifying adherence to environmental standards as for instance set 
up by a branche organisation 
6 procedural instruments 
- ISO 9000 Series 
- ISO 14000 Series (partly) 
 
The international standard on environmental auditing, ISO 14001, for instance, is a procedural 
instrument, requiring firms to take due notice of environmental aspects in their operations, 
like having an environmental policy plan, having officials responsible for checking on its 
progress, etc. If rules were incorporated on how to further specify environmental 
performance, the instrument would become a cultural instrument. 
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Multinational company tradable emission permits  
 
Some major oil companies, including Shell, have introduced emission trading between the firms 
comprising these multinational companies. The emission trading focuses on climate changing 
emissions, like carbon dioxide and methane. Each independent business unit within Shell has an 
amount of emissions rights which may be sold to other Shell units. There is an accounting 
system which establishes the actual emissions of each unit. Emissions without a permit are not 
allowed, resulting in a company-internal cost penalty. If a unit has more permits than it needs it 
will try to sell them to other units. If it wants to expand, it may acquire permits on the internal 
but global company market. The total amount of emission permits is being reduced slowly, 
according to the environmental plans of the company, by reducing the allowable emission 
volume per permit each year. The business expansion and the reduction of the overall emission 
volume permitted puts an upward pressure on permit prices. Environmentally oriented 
technological development leads to a downward pressure. What will the effects of this 
instrument be? 
 
The effects in terms of company emissions are quite clear: the  goals of the Shell environmental 
policy plan are realised, while leaving technological freedom to the business units. The emission 
reduction is realised in the most efficient way, as each business unit reduces its emissions to the 
level where cost reductions are (roughly) equal to the costs of having the permit. A main 
problem in implementing such a system is the system boundaries chosen. How may firms partly 
owned by Shell and partly by other companies participate in the scheme? What happens to the 
total amount of Shell permits if Shell sells some of its activities, or acquires others? 
 
What the net environmental effects in global society will be, in terms of reduced climate 
changing emissions, is less clear, due to, in this case, quite complex indirect effects. In activities 
where a company has competitors with less stringent policies, its costs will go up, relatively 
speaking. Hence, in the course of time, there will be a shift to firms not  participating in that (or 
a similar) emission permit trading scheme. Also, questions arise as to how company 
environmental policy relates to public environmental policies in the different countries where 
the company operates. If more stringent policies are introduced in some countries, the permit 
system does not have effects there anymore, as induced costs of emission reduction are higher 
than the permit costs. With emissions taxes, in some countries, the firms involved will have a 
higher incentive to reduce emissions than other firms in the company. The overall efficiency 
within the company then is reduced. In this sense companies using such a scheme will create an 
argument against more stringent national policies. With public policies less stringent than the 
company scheme, public policy becomes superfluous. Here multinationals like Shell create an 
incentive for national governments to implement more stringent policies. The overall effect will 
be that public policies will tend to be harmonised at a global level towards the level of emission 
reduction as indicated by the large multinationals. Especially if most multinationals would come 
up with similar and equally stringent schemes, there would be a clear drive towards uniform 
policies, at the level of stringency as chosen by those firms, and not by governments. It should 
be relatively easy to expand the tradable permit system to trade between firms. Also, the choice 
of their policy instrument will influence policy implementation by governments as well, making 
it very difficult for instance to implement emission taxing schemes on top of the company 
tradable emission permit scheme. Shell chairman Moody-Stuart  calls upon governments to 
implement similar market based mechanisms for achieving their Kyoto targets.  
 
See for further information on the Shell tradable emission permit system (STEPS): 
www.shell.com/climate 
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2.4 Social embedding of instruments  
Policy development and implementation, in terms of selecting and applying instruments, is 
not a mechanical procedure with results coming out independent from the broader social 
context and independent from the qualities of the actors involved. There have been simple 
views on the policy process which assume that the legislator enacts what is best and that the 
regulations will then be implemented by law abiding officers with the intended effects as 
results, of course only so if the technical preparations for legislation had been done properly. 
Political scientists since long (see e.g. Easton 1965) have shown how at a systems level, 
policy making is related to political support, limiting options for politicians and making the 
expected outcome of regulations only one aspect in the process. Sociologists of law have 
shown that similar laws work out differently depending on the administrative and social 
context in which they are functioning. A main difference, e.g., is that between the litigative 
American style of regulation, where laws are often fiercely debated and enacted after lengthy 
litigative procedures, while in England and also in the Netherlands the policy process is more 
horizontal, with officials influencing private decisions through discussion and information, 
and only ultimately through threats with strong regulatory reactions to non-co-operative 
regulatees (cf. Vogel, 1986; Jänicke et al., 1998). Implementation then may take place ‘in the 
shadow of the law’, without any new laws or permits being enacted, or, in a private context, 
with contracts being signed. 
 
In current administrative science, this has lead to more emphasis on the process of policy 
formulation and implementation, with less emphasis on the more formal characteristics of 
policies in terms of instrumentation. Policy making then easily is seen as a discursive process 
between all those involved, with outcomes in terms of their environmental actions based on 
power, interests, resources and shrewdness of the actors involved. We tend to (what we see 
as) a balanced view in this respect, indicating the role of policy instruments both in terms of 
structuring discussions and as indispensable means to wield power and shape both society and 
environment. Of course, this does not deny the fact that politics plays an essential part in 
policy development, nor that social processes are fundamental both in terms of policymaking, 
including instrumentation, and in policy implementation, using instruments. 
 
Taking apart the process and the policy instruments being used in the policy process 
sometimes is quite straightforward. The US, for instance, has enacted laws on tradable 
emission permits for SO2 emissions, after lengthy research on how this instrument may 
function (see, e.g., Cass et al., 1982) and lengthy political discussions on its advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of efficiency and ease of implementation. Implementation is a mainly 
administrative process, upheld by checks and balances in which self-regulation plays a central 
role. Nobody wants his competitors to have a free ride, and therefore all trading parties 
support officials checking the outcomes of emission trade.  The instrument is clearly 
differentiated from its broader social and political context.  
With other instruments, however, the distinction is not so clear. Covenants between 
governments and groups of firms may be looked upon from different angles. In some 
instances, they create the discussion platform for coming to concrete actions, as in the Dutch 
packaging covenant. In that sense, it is not an instrument but a procedure that may lead to 
instrumental use, if needed. Or covenants may already specify concrete actions for specific 
parties, as also is the case in the Dutch packaging covenant. The ‘shadow of the law’ is very 
explicitly present in this covenant, where it is stated that the covenant replaces direct 
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regulation and, if not successful, will be followed by more direct regulation. The threat, of 
course, works only if regulatees - here: the private partners to the covenant contract - expect 
government to be able to come up with this legislation, if  deemed necessary. 
 
Voluntary approaches (including voluntary agreements) cover procedural variants of 
regulatory instruments (I; 6) and also most social instruments, usually functioning in the 
shadow of the law. They are to be distinguished from the social procedures followed in the 
preparation of other types of regulatory instruments, which themselves are not voluntary, like 
permits or emission taxes. The difference is not always sharp though, as in the example of 
“permit preparation”, formerly the main instrument in Great Britain and the Netherlands. In 
the research on voluntary approaches, a most striking conclusion is that little is known about 
the functioning of such voluntary approaches (cf. Harrison, 1999). Their effectiveness has not 
been studied thoroughly, and where it is assumed, it seems a matter of belief mainly. This 
belief seems similar to the old belief that binding instruments would automatically lead to the 
effects as specified. In the US, this may have been the case to some extent, but in most 
European countries, there is a well-known gap between legislation and execution. In addition, 
the legislation may enact what would have happened anyway. Effectiveness as being in line 
with legislation thus is safeguarded, while effectiveness of policy in terms of a behavioural 
adjustment for environmental improvement may be more or less lacking.  
2.5  Instrument analysis and evaluation 
In assessing policy instruments, a combination of normative and empirical analysis is 
required. The normative analysis guides the empirical analysis, as only results that are 
relevant normatively are relevant in the assessment. As always, however,  things are not as 
simple in practice as they are in principle.  
 
Empirically, two types of mechanisms are involved in the effect route towards environmental 
policy aims, or, broader defined, sustainability aims, and the broader set of norms and values 
of which they are a part. The first group is those in society, with many human control options, 
the second one in the environment, with hardly any control options. For both types of 
analysis, one may distinguish between primary effect mechanisms, essentially reducing 
causalities to one single chain, and secondary mechanisms, involving feedback loops 
modelled in a simple or more advanced way. Normatively, there is no well-structured set of 
values that can be linked to environmental problems. There is some ordering, however, in 
main value fields, as related to human health, economic prosperity, and the quality of nature. 
Amenity aspects, distributional aspects, the kind of our relation to the dead and living 
environment, and other normative aspects may be added. 
 
As empirical analysis often is very scanty in environmental affairs, one either has to use 
assumptions, or one has to adapt the norms and values to the risks and uncertainties involved. 
We do not know with any precision what will happen if we continue to emit large amounts of 
greenhouse gases. The effect chains in the environment are rather uncertain and effects on 
society are very much conditional. Therefore, the assessment of predicted effects on “end 
point” might not be the relevant method to evaluate policy instruments to reduce climate 
change. One step back is to accept the uncertainties, and involve values on uncertainty to 
create new values, as are underlying the ‘precautionary principle’.  
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Another method to come to an operational assessment of policies and instruments is to look at 
their efficiency, taking their main goal as a reference. Although efficiency is highly important, 
even in the field of political feasibility it cannot be the sole judge on the quality of policy 
instruments. The main reason is that all partial policies will lead to some kind of problem 
shifting. Reducing acid emissions requires virgin resources and leads to additional other 
emissions, including greenhouse gas emissions. So the judgement on policies and instruments 
ultimately is based on their integrated evaluation or assessment, involving various social and 
environmental mechanisms and effects which are but very partially known. 
 
This state of the art is discomforting but should not lead to complacency. In real life, as 
opposed to science, a best guess is better than none, and defective but encompassing 
evaluation schemes are to be preferred to doing nothing, or fixing policy on some partial 
effects because other things have not been fully proven. For striking the balance, one at least 
needs to know what is not fully proven, and to see where problems in evaluation reside. A 
possibly faulty evaluation hence is better than none, and policy instruments should be set up 
in a way which best reflects available knowledge and accepted social norms and values. 
 
 
 
The main lines of this section can be summarised as follows.  
Policy instruments are not given entities to be investigated; they are social 
constructions with many degrees of freedom. 
Four main dimensions are central to the definition of specific instruments but 
probably not enough for a full specification of operational instruments. They are: the 
nature of actor relations; the instrument mechanism in implementation; the objects 
influenced; and the operational environmental goals embodied in the instruments. 
The four dimensions as filled in span up an instrument space. Criteria, ultimately 
evaluation criteria, guide the route through this instrument design space for relevant 
instrument choices. 
Instruments are building blocks in the process of policy formulation and  policy 
implementation; they are not the policy itself.  
In actual policies, public and private, consensual acts are at the core of behavioural 
adjustments. This should not obscure the fact that power and interests play a central 
role in such processes and that power is very much based on the availability of 
operational policy instruments.  
Transaction costs of environmental policy limit the ultimate effectiveness. Focussing 
on social procedures may enhance the effectiveness of specific policies, but implicitly 
excludes other policies being developed and implemented.  
Structural instruments like liability rules and taxes may exert their influence with low 
transaction costs and potentially high environmental effectiveness, but for the time 
being only on a limited domain of environmental effects.  
In design, analysis and evaluation, one part of the analysis is empirical and one part 
normative. 
The empirical analysis is partially subjective and concerns direct, indirect and as far 
as possible also secondary effects. 
The criteria for instrument and policy evaluation refer to direct expected effects, but 
also include second order criteria and strategic criteria, placed in a long term view of 
development of environmental policy instrumentation. 
See also Figure 3 on the next page. 
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Figure 3   
A framework for design, analysis and evaluation of environmental policy instruments 
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3 POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN A LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 The future context of instruments 
Policy instruments do not function in a void. Structural changes in society and the 
environment lead to shifting conditions, with different functioning of existing instruments and 
new options for new instruments. Simple mechanisms may be at the core of an instrument, 
rightly taken for granted when first using the instrument but not so in the long run. For 
instance, the workhorse of environmental policy in Great Britain and the Netherlands is the 
permit for individual installations. It was assumed that decisions on how to operate these 
could be discussed with those responsible, before starting design and building of installations 
and long before a permit was due. Planning of the firm and planning of the permitting 
procedure were aligned, with quite some procedural flexibility. In many sectors, the planning 
and implementation of technologies are now reduced to months instead of years and involve 
integrated decisions on technologies implemented worldwide. Discussions with the local 
environmental authority will only be on some details but not on the technology itself. Nor 
may discussions be on factors involving real costs shifts, as expected costs have been 
incorporated already in the decision making in the network of firms involved in the 
technology. Therefore, the role of local authorities in the strategic and tactical aspects of 
technology development has been reduced to virtually zero in most cases of permitting. Only 
additional instruments like large bags of money may bring back some influence in exceptional 
cases. For instance, highly efficient and environmentally benign coal gasification plants for 
power generation are built only with huge subsidies now, globally numbering not more than a 
dozen installations so far. Therefore, in developing the instruments for environmental policy, 
as an operational set, one has to take into account such long-term developments in society, not 
only in the local firms but also in the broader settings in society.  
 
A number of such developments have to be addressed, including indications of their potential 
meaning for the instrumentation of environmental policy. Relevant and significant 
developments are in the overall structure of society; in general cultural developments; in 
developments in the economy and specifically in industrial relations; in the changing role of 
government; and last but not least, in the changing nature of environmental problems. With 
some more detail, we also will look into the consequences of globalisation. Next, the 
prospects for different policy instruments in a changing world are worked out. These 
prospects do not automatically lead to a clear direction as to which instrument, to use when 
and how. In this respect, also policy instrumentation as  a societal development itself is non-
determined and based on strategic decisions. Some major strategic choices in policy 
instrumentation will be identified in the last section of the chapter, nearing the arena of 
political discussion.  
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3.2 General tendencies in society 
In the social structure of Western countries, there is a decreasing role to be observed of 
intermediate organisations like churches, unions, parties, and clubs. The institutional 
integration is weakened and the indirect control on individuals is reduced. Mirrored in this 
structural development is a double cultural development. Already long ago, Riesman (1950) 
described the first as a change from inner directed to other directed control of  the behaviour 
of an person. This means that it is not internalised norms and values that guide specific 
choices, but the notions of others on that subject as determining his choices. The second 
tendency, stated still longer ago by Tönnies (1887) relates to who these others are. The 
reference group for one’s norms and values is shifting from closely knit small group partners 
for life, one’s ‘Gemeinschaft’, to larger groups of more shifting acquaintances, the 
‘Gesellschaft’. These basic developments lead to new forms of integration. The differences 
between national cultures are diminishing, as global culture is developing through shared TV 
programmes, advertisements, books and movies; the nearly universal marketing of products; 
and through internationalisation of contacts via tourism and the internet. Though some 
discussion is possible on new ways of small group integration, the tendencies as specified all 
lead in the same direction: normative control on individuals in their roles as consumers and 
producers is decreasing. The legitimacy of measures thus has diminished and will not play its 
invisible (quasi-automatic) role the way it used to. Therefore, the assumption that rules will be 
followed automatically may increasingly be questioned. 
 
In the economy, a deep structural change is taking place, based on new technologies and new 
forms of communication. The amount of specialised knowledge embodied in a given product 
is expanding and the technological complexity in or behind most products is increasing. The 
innovative capacity of firms is increasingly based on functionally differentiated, more or less 
independent innovation generating organisations. At the same time, the organisation of 
successful firms is more open to external options for innovation. A large firm like Shell has 
placed its main research capacity in an independent organisation, called Global Solutions, 
with Shell as a main client, but operating in the world market. The market for innovations has 
increasingly become a global one in industrial production, including and relying on the 
information and service industries. It is here that future technologies with their specific 
environmental consequences are born and start diffusing all over the world. Technological 
innovation, viewed by Schumpeter as the capacity of owners of firms to innovate their own 
activities, now has become a more or less independent capacity at the service of all other 
firms. It is an open question whether ‘Schumpeterian dynamics’ and the Rio Imperative of 
sustainability can be made compatible, based on the development of  zero emission or Factor 
Ten technology which will not come by itself. When firms want to invest in new installations 
there will often be a fait accompli: here and now, or not here at all. Delays by environmental 
permitting procedures are becoming increasingly unacceptable for the firm, after having 
acquired the new and superior technology from the specialised technology developers abroad, 
with only weeks or months advantage on its competitors. So, in this new situation, traditional 
regulatory controls on technologies clearly have to be redefined, as they no longer can be 
based on insight from the regulator in the firm he is regulating. 
 
Another structural change in the economy is the shift from product to service. This 
development takes place with traditional hardware, as with cars not bought but increasingly 
being leased. In addition, it is embodied in the emerging information and communication 
technologies. The hardware is owned by providers while clients pay for services only. This 
development is taken one step further when firms do not provide services but act as service-
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providing organisations, leaving the actual physical activities related to service provision to 
smaller units, operating on a competitive market. Franchising is one older example, but in 
industrial production, the designer and marketer now externalise production to a high degree. 
A fast growing firm like Nokia is an example, with suppliers of all main parts being chosen 
flexibly every few months. If not externalised outside the firm, larger organisations set up 
business units which in many respects function as independent firms, selling and delivering 
their goods and services to other business units in the organisation but also on the outside 
markets, while other business units are not obliged to buy their inputs from business units 
within the same firm. No doubt, this downsizing of organisations combined with increased 
international competition for more or less standardised activities makes environmental control 
on such standardised mass production activities very hard for individual countries. The non-
standardised, creative and strategic parts of the innovation process may hardly have 
discernable environmental effects and they are not influenced by binding instruments or 
market instruments, leaving the scene to softer informational instruments and to structural 
instruments with a limited environmental scope. 
 
Pointing in the same direction is the changing nature of coordination in the economy. There is 
a marked shift from hierarchical control to coordination by contracts and markets. Contracts 
and markets are not fully anonymous but involve flexible relations, increasingly based on 
global communication networks. Anything can be bought anywhere in the world on short 
notice. Mainly fixed points are the locations of consumers and employees and some bulk 
resources, while most of the other aspects of the physical economic activities are variable as 
to location, also due to decreasing transport costs. Formerly the domain of the large 
multinationals, now also small and medium sized enterprises turn into small multinationals, 
integrated in international networks. In consequence of these developments, national 
regulators must feel their powers vanishing.  
 
Will there be an end to increasing global production and consumption, thus easing the 
pressure on the environment? Here, recent developments point the other way. Economic 
growth is increasing again in the last decade, real growth being in the order of 3% per year, 
doubling consumption every 23 years; international trade is increasing by 7% per year. The 
growth in labour productivity, as the central factor in economic growth, is not matched by a 
proportional decrease in total labour time.  
 
Tendencies in government reflect these broader developments. The ideal of planning the 
future is dead. It still is reflected in names like, in the Netherlands, the Central Planning 
Bureau, but planning, even indicative planning as existed in France, has gone, both in 
government and in business (Mintzberg, the ‘guru’ on strategic planning in the firm, has 
named his last book ‘The end of strategic planning’). Where targets are set, as the reduction 
targets for greenhouse gas emissions in the Kyoto protocol, the link between the quantitative 
goal and implementation activities is quite weak, as global implementation mechanisms in the 
form of policy instruments are lacking. So, some of the vocabulary is still there, but planning 
and control are fading away. Especially the strong control as used to be present in the 
informal ways of regulation in Great Britain and the Netherlands has lost its glamour. 
Ultimately, the informal flexibility was backed up by the power of officials to implement 
what they liked, even if unreasonable. Negotiating ‘in the shadow of the law’ is increasingly 
difficult and the instruments involved have changed in nature. It seems these countries are all 
shifting towards American, more formalised and litigative procedures. This does not help 
much in the new situation of global competition on technologies and products. 
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New developments are also in avoiding the complexities and costs of formalised regulation by 
consensus building. Consensual processes are  main vehicles for change, with horizontal 
government as a principle. In local affairs, those involved knew each other already, and 
horizontal government is not so much of a change. For higher level problems, as 
environmental problems increasingly are, this is a change as compared to previous practice. 
This tendency builds on corporate ideas of incorporating all main parties involved in a 
negotiating procedure, in which win-win situations are created, leading to the advantage of 
all. In corporate government it was the tops of the socio-economic institutions making deals; 
now it is ‘those involved’” in general, the stakeholders, who together decide on some problem 
or action. On the one hand, this tendency reflects the decreasing power of national 
governments. On the other hand, horizontal government also is an impetus for less active and 
less binding types of regulation. The consequence for environmental policy could be that for 
most problems, the hard way of setting standards more stringent than those involved think 
reasonable is not an open route any more; only information, stimulation and financial 
incentives may remain available if this tendency continues. 
3.3 Globalisation tendencies 
In the previous survey of tendencies, one recurring element was globalisation. Environmental 
problems increasingly are transboundary or global ones; economic production processes 
integrate at the global level for a global consumer market; and a global culture is emerging, at 
least in consumption. International political integration in blocks is loosing momentum in 
favour of, still limited, integration at the global level. Examples of the latter are the strength of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the vehemence of the political discussion on its 
further expansion vis-à-vis social and environmental interests. Together these developments 
pose severe problems for national environmental policy formation and instrumentation.  
 
The consequences for instruments are that binding instruments based on command and 
control at a technological level are harder to apply. Any instrument with real effectiveness 
induces costs. The idea that economic-environmental win-win situations will emerge 
spontaneously is attractive but highly improbable as the structural causes for environmental 
problems remain and environmental pressures increase because of population growth and 
economic growth. It seems that win-win situations are related to weak sustainability, where 
innovations are attractive environmentally and economically, per unit of product. As at the 
same time economic growth is implied, the overall effects, at a macro level, will usually be 
detrimental to environmental quality. We therefore assume that for a longer time to come 
environmental policy is not superfluous at all, quite to the contrary. Its nature, however, will 
have to change. 
 
Therefore, for national policies to be effective in the global context, international co-
ordination of policies is required. This co-ordination is not only at the level of setting aims, as 
now increasingly is taking place; also the set-up of instrumentation has to be agreed upon  
internationally to some extent for arriving at nationally effective policies. Some first steps 
have been taken in climate policy and biodiversity policy, where international instruments 
between countries have been worked out for joint implementation, as a political-
administrative instrument for emission trading and  a clean development mechanism. For 
instance, on a bilateral basis, countries may now trade their emission reduction obligations to 
improve overall efficiency in emission reduction. European countries invest in new 
technologies in former communist countries to reduce emissions there as compared to the 
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supposed autonomous growth of emissions in those countries. However, any simple trading 
system based on (fictitious) future emissions may easily erode collective efforts and cannot 
easily be brought in line with systematic development of regulatory instruments. Imagine that 
a country may claim a credit for helping close an old power plant or helping plant a forest in 
another country. This is possible now under joint implementation. The net influence of these 
supporting activities may become negligible if these developments would have taken place 
anyway. There then is no actual result; only a clear result on paper.  Political deals, with some 
side payments, then may become more important than real efforts for emission reduction.  
 
Tradable emission permits might be implemented as a regulatory instrument as well. The 
question then is who would receive the emission rights being traded and how the initial 
distribution between countries would be. Whatever the initial distribution, after some time 
real emitters would have to have the emission rights corresponding to their emission volumes. 
Such a system would be more transparent, but it would have severe implications in the 
normative set-up of instrumentation. For global efficiency in climate policy, trade in private 
emission rights would have to be preferred on the same efficiency grounds now used in favour 
of joint implementation. Broader ethical considerations as embodied in the normative-legal 
structure of most countries would favour instruments in line with the polluter-pays-principle. 
In this case, emission taxes are to be preferred. Especially in the case of carbon dioxide 
emissions, such taxes could be set up relatively easy in principle. In working out such taxes, 
the main choices are on who receives the proceeds from the taxes. It could be the national 
governments implementing them; this would create an incentive for effective implementation. 
However, the carbon resource owning countries would effectively pay a large part of the bill 
through reduced prices for gas, oil and coal. In current thought on legal frameworks as 
discussed in the WTO, they might have a right on compensation. Also, the emerging global 
political community, as, for instance, a World Environment and Development Organisation 
(see Simonis 1998), needs financing and the carbon tax  proceeds would seem an 
ideologically acceptable source. 
3.4 Prospects for instruments 
As explained above, the role of technology binding instruments is expected to further 
decrease. Only in nationally guarded industries, like building and infrastructure, and in the 
context of some internationally binding agreements, as with the Montreal Protocol, binding 
instruments may remain dominant. International coordination, as through technology 
guidelines or BAT rules, may also help in leaving some space for binding instruments. In 
other fields, different instrument types will take over or at least will become more important. 
Cultural and informational instruments are emerging now for guiding private choices in 
production and consumption, like the life cycle assessment LCA and Environmental Audits, 
as both standardised by ISO . Especially if the information in such tools for analysis is 
complemented with the normative information as to the relative importance of different types 
of effects, such instruments may have a broad influence. However, they create a limited 
incentive only, due to the collective nature of most of the environmental effects involved. 
Where real choices are to be made, with substantial costs involved in environmental 
improvements, information and normative statements will not suffice. If binding instruments 
loose their importance in limiting options, only financial instruments and liability instruments 
can substantially correct the pay-offs for those making choices, be they governments, business 
and environmental associations, or private producers and consumers. Softer cultural 
instruments are important to support prime movers and to generate political support.   
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So the main problem for future environmental policy relates to how to compensate for the 
diminishing role of technology-specific binding regulations. The role of financial instruments 
so far is limited, with only few exceptions. Broader use is based on a number of conditions. A 
clear choice between issuing emission permits, against the polluter-pays-principle or creating 
emission taxes is required. The operational applicability at the level of emissions and resource 
use (eg CO2 taxes), as opposed to application at products and technologies, has to be 
improved. And international coordination in terms of set-up and levels of taxes is needed to 
avoid unjust shifts in competitiveness between firms in different countries. For cultural 
instruments a better integration of different environmental aspects is required, as real actions 
always involve virtually all environmental problems as exist. This not only is a matter of 
information but of clearer normative guidance as to the relative importance of different 
environmental interventions, based on their potential consequences. Conceptual unclarity is a 
main problem here. Can we specify the ultimate consequences of CO2 emissions, at an 
‘endpoint’ level, in a realistic way? Or should we evaluate at the ‘midpoint’ level of global 
warming potentials? Or are potential instability and uncertainty the prime motives for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions? Such questions need to be answered in a very practical 
manner if a trade-off between for instance energy use, land use, and a diverse set of emissions 
is at stake, as is the case in most practical decisions in production and consumption. Such a 
normative guidance not only is a prerequisite for practical decisions on specific technologies, 
but also for more aggregate developments, as in the directions for technology development 
and the creation of more sustainable life styles.  
Ultimately, not only a view is needed on the relations between different environmental effects 
involved, and the trade-offs between different environmental interventions implied in our 
actions. Also the trade-off between economy and the sum total of environmental effects is to 
be stated as a clear principle, guiding the quantification of all types of instruments in a 
uniform way. Without such a guidance, equal treatment of similar cases cannot be realised, 
leading both to injustice and to substantial static and especially dynamic inefficiencies.  
Finally, structural instruments, as changes in institutions, are a not yet fully exploited option 
for new policy instrumentation. For example, the cases now brought against the tobacco 
industry in the US indicate how large the payments may be in a specific judicial setting. In all 
cases, the creation of the right incentives should be accompanied by removing the wrong 
incentives. In many countries there are substantial subsidies on energy use, as by tax 
exemptions for kerosene; the costs of infrastructure is not reflected in prices, as with un-
priced roads; and new technologies are difficult to implement due to complexities of 
regulation; and a global perspective in environmental policy development is prevented, as 
implied in emerging WTO regulations.  
If such a broad shift in policy implementation would emerge, the result would be a more 
balanced internalisation of environmental consequences, both in public and private actions. 
 
For newly emerging environmental problems, instrumentation usually is missing. The 
appropriation of nature (Fischer-Kowalski 1997), that is a decreasing share of nature in total 
biomass production, which is accompanied by an even faster reduction in natural biomass 
breakdown, as the source of food for all fungi and animals. This is one such a new 
environmental problem, here defined at ‘midpoint’ level, related to biodiversity, the life 
support function of ecology and the quality of nature. There hardly seem instruments 
available which may work at a global level. For some aspects, such as the protection of 
available genetic information, the road towards structural-institutional instruments has been 
taken, with governments or private organisations owning the species on their territories and 
their genes, either naturally found in organisms, or constructed. This may help in protecting 
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and regulating the existence of gene pools. It does, however, not necessarily help in creating 
healthy ecological conditions. Preponderance of single protected genes, as in agricultural 
production, may even lead to monocultures of such economically dominant genes, with 
probably negative overall ecological effects.  
For saving and creating ecological values, there now are two lines in instrumentation. One is 
the creation of nature reserves, as an option-creating instrument. Increased spatial needs for 
food production, for growing and more affluent populations, and increased mono-cultural 
production of biomass for energy purposes literally leave less room for this instrument, given 
the mainly fixed amount of  land on earth (which even will decrease due to sea level rise).  
The other, integration” line is to create more ecological quality in areas primarily used for 
agriculture, recreation, infrastructure, production and housing. Again, the options have hardly 
been investigated and instrumentation is mainly lacking. Apart from emission reducing 
instruments, there is a clear lack of instruments safeguarding ecological richness in diversity 
and volume, not only in nature reserves, but also in human-dominated ecosystems. 
Furthermore, ecology-oriented instruments still lack theoretical foundations and operational 
development. 
3.5 Strategic instrument choices ahead 
Our first assumption here is that it is not possible to avoid the choice on environmental policy 
instruments, by doing nothing. Economic growth, population growth, and globalisation 
tendencies make internationally coordinated policy development unavoidable. However, it is 
not possible to make choices on policy instrumentation independently in each case. A well-
argumented strategy is to guide serious development of policy instruments. If the polluter-
pays-principle holds, all instruments have to take it into account. Basic choices preferably 
should be made consistently, according to well-recognised principles. Some main lines in 
development are discussed here, related to basic liability rules; to environmental ethics; to the 
importance of efficiency and equity; to means-directed or goal-directed types of instruments; 
and finally, to principles of policy integration.  
Liability rules 
Liability rules have traditionally been set up as to prevent active infringements on the goods 
or rights owned by others, either individually or collectively. In the 1960s a debate started in 
economic circles on the other option, to give everybody a right on infringement of the goods 
or rights of others, especially in the environmental domain. The discussion was opened by 
Coase (1960), who showed that for the outcome in real terms there was no difference between 
these options, if transaction costs for arriving at these outcomes could be neglected in both 
cases. In the following discussions, the latter restriction has been broadened somewhat in that 
the conclusion of Coase also holds if transaction costs are similar. This point of view has had 
a deep influence on environmental policy, where, in the same period, the polluter-pays-
principle had been broadly accepted. Different versions of this principle exist. A basic 
element is that polluters have to pay for the environmental damages they cause, thus 
internalising environmental aspects in their decision making. As Coase showed that the 
principle is not required for cost-effective policies, policy makers may  argument policy 
instruments on the basis of net costs in terms of real outcomes including transaction costs, and 
do ‘what is best’, at a case level. This opened the road to tradable emission permits, which 
give the owners a direct right to pollute. The conflict between the polluter-pays-principle and 
the pragmatic do-per-case-what-is-best-principle somehow needs to be clarified and resolved 
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for basic innovation in national, and particularly in international policy instrumentation. In-
between options are possible, but not necessarily more attractive (see Tisdell 1998). One 
option is to market emission permits with a very limited duration of validity. Effectively, for 
operations the right to emit then is to be bought every time again. If the amount of permits 
brought on the market by governments is set to realise a predetermined price level, the 
difference with an emission tax of a similar level is really very small. 
Ethical norms 
In the international setting of a globalising world, basic discussions are on which ethical 
principles give guidance in handling distributional effects. Should all citizens of the world 
have an equal share in the environmental use space? Is this share tradable? Does every citizen 
have the same right on a certain minimum environmental quality? Are the costs for 
environmental improvements to be distributed equally per head? Or is an equal percentage of 
income to be spent on environmental protection?  
 
The answers on such questions have a direct bearing on instrument choice. Internationally,  
emission rights, with initial rights distributed to countries according to their share in world 
population, as a political-administrative instrument, would be in line with an equal 
environmental use space. Emission permits with levels based on attracting employment and 
income give more emission space to the poor. Equal emission taxes worldwide would roughly 
lead to equal shares of income being paid for environmental protection. If such principles 
were more than a guise for tactical interest protection, i.e. if they have a real meaning, the 
implications for policy instrumentation would be quite direct. Still, there is not one principle 
that can force the choice. 
Efficiency and equity 
A further strategic choice concerns the relation between global efficiency and global equity. 
For efficiency purpose, in the world as a whole, marginal costs of environmental protection or 
improvement should be equal, which means that in all choices environmental improvements 
should be realised till a certain level of cost per unit of improvement. If this rule is not 
satisfied, with some doing less and others doing more, the world can benefit from a shift in 
effort, with those still having cheap options for improvement doing more and those with high 
costs of improvement doing less. A real Pareto improvement is possible then, with everybody 
being better off if those reducing efforts compensate those increasing their efforts at 
environmental improvements.  
 
The current emphasis on efficiency as a guiding principle for trade relations would indicate 
that this principle would also have prime importance in environmental policy instrumentation. 
Internationally tradable (private) emission permits and globally equal emission taxes would be 
prime instruments. Who is receiving the ‘grandfathering’ rewards of initial permit 
distribution, and who is receiving the proceeds from the emission taxes is not relevant for 
efficiency considerations. This indicates that there is some room for combining efficiency 
with equity, by redistribution of proceeds. Full emphasis on equity will indicate other 
instruments, however. The justice principle (as embodied in the polluter-pays-principle) 
would shift the choice from emission permits to taxes on negative environmental impacts. 
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Goal oriented and means oriented instruments 
A further main choice is on the aim as made operational in the environmental policy 
instruments. For instance, emphasis on easy implementation corresponds with regulators 
having a clear grip on technology development and making policy integration an aspect of 
policy development. Dynamic efficiency, the most important cost aspect in the long run, 
remains a problem in this approach. This means-oriented approach is contrasted with the goal-
oriented approach in which policy instruments are to internalise sustainability goals as fully 
and directly as possible, allowing for decentralised technology choice with incentives for 
environmental improvements.  
 
It is clear that efficiency considerations also indicate a choice for the goals oriented option. In 
the liberal ideal, the choice is clearly for goal directed instrumentation. In socio-democratic 
and socialist circles, the choice might be more means directed. However, current ideas in 
European socio-democratic parties indicate that the broad integration of environmental 
considerations in private decision making is to be preferred as against the option of having 
governments decide on technology choices per case. So there is a broad aim towards goal 
oriented instruments, though means oriented instruments still are the main vehicle for 
environmental policy now. 
Principles for policy integration 
In means oriented policy instrumentation, the integration between different environmental 
aspects involved is implicit. One may assume, optimistically, that a single policy maker is 
consistent in the way the implicit trade-offs between different environmental aspects are 
made, and also the trade-offs against social and economic aspects. If different policy makers 
are involved, both in different public and private organisations, one cannot expect consistency 
to come about automatically. In goal oriented policies, there is an explicit statement on the 
relative importance of different environmental aspects related to activities, at the operational 
level of emission, extractions and disturbances, that is trade-offs are more explicitly to be 
stated, allowing for equal trade-offs in different situations. An example is the equivalency of 
14 tonnes of SO2 and 1 tonne of CO2 as is being used informally in Dutch environmental 
policy.  
 
For reasoned choices in this respect explicit statements are needed on why these trade-offs 
have been chosen, and how these environmental aspects are linked to concrete economic 
actions. Such relations depend both on evolving normative ideas about what is important, on 
the state and development of environment and society, and on the way these relations may be 
modelled. Consistency, also in time, can only come about on the basis of an explicit and 
encompassing discussion. This ideological superstructure to operational policy is poorly 
developed. In Dutch environmental policy, the themes approach has been developed as a 
conceptual framework over a decade ago, with themes like eutrophication, acidification, and 
ozone depletion. This approach has been followed by others, in different ways. The European 
Union, for instance, defined a large number of Preferential European Environmental 
Problems. They did so not as a systematic treatment of the subject but as a consensus bag, 
including quite incommensurate items ranging from waste prevention to biodiversity 
preservation. Waste prevention, however, is not an environmental aim but a means for 
reaching environmental aims. Through the backdoor, the means oriented approach thus comes 
in again. The explicit and general normative integration of environmental policy aims, as 
opposed to the implicit choices sufficing for technology binding instruments, is a clear task 
ahead. 
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SURVEY BOX: 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN A LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE 
social structure  
less intermediate organisations 
liability expanding 
more private and national ownership of 
biotic resources  
culture  
smaller role of internalised norms and 
values 
smaller role of local groups  
increasing role of international mass 
media 
some cultural elements globalising 
government 
formalised and litigative tendencies in 
binding instruments 
decreasing role of binding instruments 
increasing role of horizontal mechanisms 
economy 
increasing technological complexity 
functional differentiation of innovation 
from product to service 
from service provider to service organiser 
co-ordination: from hierarchies to markets 
and contracts 
more flexible co-ordination in networks 
time for communication drastically 
shortened 
globalisation of markets 
regional economic blocks succumbing in 
globalisation 
high rates of annual economic growth and 
industrial trade 
population 
continuing growth for the next decades 
high growth in most poor countries 
no further growth in industrialised 
countries 
higher average age in industrialised 
countries 
 
environment 
ecological resources decreasing  
local problems dealt with reasonably 
emphasis shifting to continental and global 
problems 
abiotic depletion shifted to the very far 
future 
appropriation of nature increasing, biotic 
depletion increasing 
climate change  continuing 
biodiversity loss continuing 
nature areas fast decreasing 
prospects for instruments 
effectiveness of instruments: halving 
environmental effects per unit of income 
every 25 years  
internationally co-ordinated instrument 
choices essential  
instruments for safeguarding ecological 
resources to be developed 
overall effectiveness of instruments 
decreasing 
financial instruments essential for high 
trade-off between economy and 
environment 
strategic instrument choices ahead 
tradable right to environmental damages 
versus collective right on undisturbed 
environmental quality  
equal right to environmental use space 
versus equal efforts for damage reduction 
global equity versus global efficiency 
means-directed technology specific 
instruments versus goal-directed 
environmental incentives 
normative integration of policies with broad 
internalisation in society versus political-
administrative discussion per single choice 
item 
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Vocabulary 
 
 
role Set of norms determining a task for an individual in a specific 
context 
Example: Chief Environmental Executive in a corporation;  
norm Rules regarding appropriate behaviour in a certain situation. 
Example: thou shalst separate thy household wastes 
institution Coherent set of roles and norms 
example: 'marriage'; 'private property'; ‘primary school’ 
organisation Functionally independent institution 
Examples: Environmental Inspectorate; research institute; firm 
culture Knowledge, beliefs and values as are dominantly present in a 
society 
regulations Set of norms with a specified status in terms of administrative 
or statutory law 
internalisation 1 Recognition of a norm as appropriate for one's actions 
2 Adjusting somebody's behaviour in a desired way by 
establishing an appropriate mix of motives and expected effects 
collective good Main criterion: Non-rivalness; consumption by one does not 
reduce the availability to others.  
Additional criterion: non-excludability; nobody can be excluded 
from consumption. 
prisoners dilemma situation in which individual contribution to (not reducing) a 
collective good has net negative consequences for this 
individual as long a most others do not behave similarly 
altruistic behaviour behaviour not only driven by private benefits of actor but also 
by the benefits of others because actor himself values these 
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